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Abstract 
Can U.S. patent law help American businesses compete in global 
markets? In early 2011, President Barack Obama argued that, to obtain 
economic prosperity, the United States must “out-innovate . . . the rest of 
the world,”1 and that patent reform is a “critical dimension[]”2 of this 
innovation agenda. Soon thereafter, Congress enacted the most sweeping 
reforms to U.S. patent law in more than half a century, contending that the 
changes will “give American inventors and innovators the 21st century 
patent system they need to compete.”3 Surprisingly, no legal scholar has 
assessed whether patent reform is capable of making American firms more 
competitive in global markets.  
This Article begins to fill this void by examining whether U.S. patent 
law can provide U.S. innovators with enhanced incentives to invent. This 
Article argues that traditional approaches to improving U.S. patent law, 
including the recent patent reform act, likely will do little to help 
Americans invent more than their foreign rivals. Nevertheless, helping 
U.S. businesses compete in global markets is vital to our economic 
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 1. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address (Jan. 25, 
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-
state-union-address. 
 2. NAT’L ECONOMIC COUNCIL, ET AL., A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION: SECURING 
OUR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 2 (Feb. 2011).  
 3. Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Comment of Senator Leahy on the Senate Motion 
to Proceed to the America Invents Act (Aug. 2, 2011), available at  http://www.leahy.senate.gov/ 
press/comment-of-senator-leahy-on-the-senate-motion-to-proceed-to-the-america-invents-act. 
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prosperity, as we face a crippling recession, declining innovation capacity, 
and increasing pressure from foreign competition. Accordingly, this Article 
argues that federal lawmakers should consider nontraditional approaches to 
U.S. patent law, including using law to foster a culture in the United States 
that promotes innovation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For over a century, the United States has been one of the most 
innovative countries in the world.4 U.S. inventors pioneered the airplane,5 
                                                                                                                     
 4. See, e.g., JUDY ESTRIN, CLOSING THE INNOVATION GAP: REIGNITING THE SPARK OF 
CREATIVITY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 71 (2009) (asserting that in the 1970s the United States was 
technologically preeminent); Rep. Lamar Smith, Pass Patent Reform to Create Jobs, POLITICO.COM 
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the electric light bulb,6 the polio vaccine,7 the transistor,8 the personal 
computer,9 and the Internet.10 Indeed, in 2005, the National Council on 
Competitiveness (a nonpartisan and nongovernmental organization 
composed of CEOs, university presidents, and labor leaders) proclaimed 
that “[i]nnovation has always been deep in America’s soul.”11  
Recently, however, many commentators have voiced fears that 
America’s innovation position is starting to erode.12 By some measures, it 
appears that the United States is not as focused on innovation as some 
countries.13 For example, Europe, not the United States, now hosts the 
                                                                                                                     
(Mar. 30, 2011, 4:47 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/52141.html (“American 
inventors have led the world in innovations for more than a century.”); see also John C. Lechleiter, 
America’s Growing Innovation Gap, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10 
001424052748704111704575354863772223910.html (“America is the inventing nation.”); Fareed 
Zakaria, The Future of American Innovation: Can America Keep Pace?, TIME (June 5, 2011), http:/ 
/www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2075226,00.html (“Innovation is as American as apple 
pie.”). 
 5. U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (filed Mar. 23, 1903) (describing a “flying machine”). This 
patent issued to “Orville Wright and Wilbur Wright, citizens of the United States, residing in the 
city of Dayton, county of Montgomery, and State of Ohio.” Id. 
 6. U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Nov. 4, 1878) (describing an “electric lamp”).  This patent 
issued to “Thomas Alva Edison of Menlo Park, in the State of New Jersey, United States of 
America.” Id. 
 7. Jonas Salk was born in New York City and developed the polio vaccine in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. JANE S. SMITH, PATENTING THE SUN: POLIO AND THE SALK VACCINE 102 (1990).  
 8. Three Americans—John Bardeen, Walter Brattain, and William Shockley—developed the 
transistor at Bell Labs in the 1940s. See David B. Haviland, The Transistor in a Century of 
Electronics, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Dec. 19, 2002), http://www.nobelprize.org/educational/physics/tran 
sistor/history/. For their work, Bardeen, Brattain, and Shockley received the Nobel Prize in Physics 
in 1956. THE NOBEL PRIZE IN PHYSICS 1956, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics 
/laureates/1956/  (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). 
 9. Inventor of the Week: The Personal Computer, LEMELSON-MIT (Apr. 2007), 
http://web.mit.edu/invent/iow/apple.html. 
 10. JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 1–2 (1999). 
 11. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, INNOVATE AMERICA: NATIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVE 
SUMMIT AND REPORT 8 (2005) [hereinafter “INNOVATE AMERICA”]; COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, 
About Us, http://www.compete.org/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
 12. See, e.g., NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE, IS AMERICA FALLING OFF THE FLAT EARTH? 17–20 
(2007) (arguing that the United States is doing poorly in “the global competition for jobs”); ESTRIN, 
supra note 4, at 4–5 (arguing that “America has lost the core values that were the catalysts of its 
[innovation] success”); JOHN KAO, INNOVATION NATION: HOW AMERICA IS LOSING ITS INNOVATION 
EDGE, WHY IT MATTERS, AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO GET IT BACK 2 (2007) (asserting that America’s 
“capacity for innovation is eroding”); INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 38; NAT’L ACADS. 
PRESS, RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM, REVISITED 5 (2010) [hereinafter “GATHERING STORM, 
REVISITED”]; Gary P. Pisano & Willy C. Shih, Restoring American Competitiveness, HARV. BUS. 
REV., July 2009, at 114–16; Lechleiter, supra note 4; see also MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 12 (1990) (“America, with skilled labor, preeminent 
scientists, and ample capital, has seen eroding export market share in industries where one would 
least expect it, such as machine tools, semiconductors, and sophisticated electronic products.”).  
 13. See, e.g., infra notes 72–102 and accompanying text. 
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largest particle accelerator in the world.14 The United States is also 
investing less in innovation than other countries, ranking eighth in the 
world in spending on research and development as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP).15 In 2000, the United States led the world in the 
deployment of broadband Internet, but by 2007, the United States ranked 
sixteenth.16 Similarly, U.S. citizens are focusing less on careers related to 
innovation than citizens of many other countries. U.S. educational 
performance related to science and engineering is notoriously mediocre.17 
“U.S. high school students underperform most of the world in international 
science and math tests,”18 and the United States ranks seventeenth in the 
world in high school graduation rate.19 Student performances during 
college and after college are similar: the United States ranks fourteenth in 
the world in college graduation rate, and thirteenth in the world in doctoral 
graduation rates.20 The United States does not lead the world in the number 
of researchers per capita,21 and even U.S. companies are offshoring their 
research and development efforts.22 General Electric, a company founded 
by American Thomas Edison,23 now has more research and development 
employees located outside of the United States than within it.24 General 
Electric is not alone. According to the National Science Foundation, almost 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Alex L. Pasternack, World’s Largest Particle Accelerator Offers Window into Laws of 
Nature, CNN.COM (May 17, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/innovation/05/11/ 
motherboard.hadron.collider/index.html; Brian Vastag, Tevatron Atom Smasher’s Close Ends Era 
of Big Science, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/tevatron-atom-smashers-close-in-illinois-ends-era-of-big-science/2011/09/29/gIQAR9SK8 
K_story.html.  
 15.  Main Science and Technology Indicators Database, OECD, 1, 14–17 (June 2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/52/47406944.pdf. Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, 
Israel, Japan, and South Korea all spend more on research and development as a percentage of GDP 
than the United States spends. Id. at 15. 
 16. ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 151. 
 17. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 30–34. 
 18. INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 49; see also Staying Competitive, NAT’L MATH + 
SCIENCE INITIATIVE, http://www.nationalmathandscience.org/solutions/challenges/staying-
competitive (last visited Mar. 2, 2013) (reporting alarming statistics regarding the performance of 
U.S. schools vis-à-vis foreign educational systems). 
 19. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 19. 
 20. Id.; New Doctorate Graduates, OECD ILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ 
sites/sti_scoreboard-2011-en/02/01/index.html?contentType=&itemId=/content/book/sti_scoreboar 
d-2011-en&containerItemId=/content/book/sti_scoreboard-2011-en&accessItemIds=&mimeType= 
text/html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). To make matters worse, the United States ranks twenty-sixth in 
the world in the percentage of doctoral degrees that are awarded in science and engineering. Id.  
 21. Main Science and Technology Indicators Database, supra note 15. 
 22.   See Pisano & Shih, supra note 12, at 116. 
 23. Thomas Edison & GE, GE.COM, http://www.ge.com/company/history/edison.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
 24. Ron Hira, U.S. Workers in a Global Job Market, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. ONLINE (Spring 
2009), http://www.issues.org/25.3/hira.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).  
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a quarter of all research and development workers employed by U.S. 
companies work outside of the United States.25  
Unfortunately, the weakening of American innovation could not come 
at a worse time, as the United States struggles to overcome a crippling 
economic recession.26 Innovation and economic prosperity are closely 
linked in that “innovation provides the fuel for economic expansion.”27 
Indeed, economists estimate that innovation accounts for the majority of 
growth in the U.S. economy.28 Innovation also has a significant impact on 
competition within global markets, and today many markets are global 
because “aviation and telecommunication revolutions have conspired to 
make distance increasingly irrelevant.”29 In these global markets, domestic 
businesses will often lose market share to more innovative foreign 
competitors. As the National Academy of Science, the National Academy 
of Engineers, and the Institute of Medicine stated in 2010, “A nation that 
does not embrace innovation will soon be left behind in the 21st century 
economy.”30  
Because of the connection between innovation and domestic economic 
prosperity, our political leaders have argued that America should refocus 
its attention on innovation to overcome its recent economic woes. 
Specifically, U.S. politicians contend that American innovation will help 
U.S. businesses capture greater shares of global markets. For example, in 
his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama argued: “The future 
is ours to win. But to get there, we can’t just stand still.”31 President 
Obama noted that other countries have made great technological progress 
and urged Americans to “out-innovate . . . the rest of the world.”32 The 
Obama Administration later stated that patent law is a “critical” 
                                                                                                                     
 25. Francisco Moris & Nirmala Kannankutty, New Employment Statistics from the 2008 
Business R&D and Innovation Survey, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. INFOBRIEF 1 (July 2010), 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf10326/nsf10326.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
 26. Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show, 
BLOOMBERG, (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news archive&sid=aNivT 
jr852TI (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
 27. INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 37. 
 28. See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 29. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 1. As one commentator has observed, globalization has 
“made Boston and Bangalore next-door neighbors.” THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL 
MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE US: HOW AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND 
HOW WE CAN COME BACK 62 (2011). 
 30. See, e.g., GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 42; accord AUGUSTINE, supra 
note 12, at 67 (“The choice is straightforward: in the 21st century, a developed nation can either 
innovate or evaporate.”). 
 31. President Obama, supra note 1. 
 32. Id. In the 2012 State of the Union address, President Obama similarly warned, “Don’t let 
other countries win the race for the future.” President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in 
State of Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.ph 
p?pid=99000.  
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mechanism for achieving this goal.33 
Congress agreed with President Obama, and in the fall of 2011 it passed 
the America Invents Act,34 which enacted the most sweeping changes to 
patent law since 1952.  Congressional sponsors for the Act insisted that it 
would help Americans compete against foreign rivals. Senator Patrick 
Leahy claimed that the Act would “give American inventors and 
innovators the 21st century patent system they need to compete.”35 
Representative Lamar Smith likewise stated that “[w]e need to modernize 
our patent system to maintain U.S. global competitiveness and bolster the 
economy.”36 Other members of Congress agreed that the reforms would 
“increase our competitiveness.”37 With bipartisan support uncommon in an 
era of bitter partisanship, the Act passed,38 and President Obama quickly 
signed it into law.39 In a speech the same day, President Obama reiterated: 
“[I]f we’re going to create jobs now and in the future, we’re going to have 
to . . . out-innovate every other country on Earth.”40 President Obama 
claimed that “[t]his change in our patent laws is part of our agenda for 
making us competitive over the long term.”41  
The appeal to U.S. politicians of using patent law to boost American 
competitiveness is perhaps understandable, as invention, innovation, and 
competition are closely linked. The goal of patent law is to encourage the 
discovery of new inventions,42 and the conventional view is that patent law 
                                                                                                                     
 33. NAT’L ECONOMIC COUNCIL, ET AL., supra note 2, at 2; see also INNOVATE AMERICA, supra 
note 11, at 11 (arguing that the United States must “[c]reate a 21st Century Intellectual Property 
Regime”). 
 34. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 35. Sen. Leahy, supra note 3.     
 36. Rep. Smith, supra note 4. 
 37. Press Release, Senator Al Franken, Sen. Franken: Long-Overdue Patent Reform Will 
Create U.S. Jobs (Sept. 8, 2011), available at http://franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1721; 
Press Release, Sen. Chris Coons, Senator Coons Praises Senate Progress in Passing Sweeping 
Patent Reform Legislation (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://coons.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/ 
release/senator-coons-praises-senate-progress-in-passing-sweeping-patent-reform-legislation. 
 38.  See  Sen. Chris Coons, supra note 37. 
 39.  Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Signs 
America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and 
Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act 
-overhauling-patent-system-stim (noting that “the President’s Council on Jobs and 
Competitiveness . . . has been a strong advocate for patent reform as a way to support job creation 
and strengthen America’s competitiveness in the global economy”).  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. By constitutional directive, patent law encourages invention by “securing for limited 
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art I, 
§ 8, cl. 8. Not all new discoveries, however, are patentable inventions. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218, 3225 (2010) (stating that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot be 
patented). 
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achieves this goal by providing incentives to invent in the form of 
exclusive rights to an invention.43 Commercializing new inventions may 
yield innovative products, services, or processes, and these innovations 
may significantly affect competition.44  
Surprisingly, although legal scholars recognize the potential of patent 
law to affect competition, they overlook the possibility that U.S. patent 
law45 might help American inventors and companies effectively compete 
against foreign rivals.46 Typically, legal scholars analyze patent law from a 
law-and-economics perspective under which the goal of patent law is the 
general promotion of economically efficient invention, ignoring the 
nationality of the inventor.47 Competitive concerns, such as which 
countries’ inventors receive patents, have received almost no attention 
from legal scholars.48 However, if changes to U.S. patent law affect 
                                                                                                                     
 43. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 44. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 259 
n.4 (2007) (“We use the term innovation . . . to refer to the process of research, invention, and 
development and refinement of new ideas.”); see also Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent 
Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1737, 1740–55 (2011) (describing effects of patent law on 
innovation). Admittedly, some inventions may have little commercial value. See, e.g., U.S. Patent 
No. 6,490,999 (filed Aug. 29, 2001) (describing a collar for walking a snake); U.S. Patent No. 
6,293,874 (filed Jan. 4, 2000) (describing “a user-operated and controlled apparatus for self-
infliction of repetitive blows to the user’s buttocks”). 
 45. “Patent law” is a vague and ambiguous term. Under a broad reading, patent law includes 
all laws related to patents. Under such a broad reading, patent law would include a provision of the 
tax code allowing an inventor to deduct costs related to obtaining a patent. See 26 U.S.C. § 174 
(2006). Under a broad reading, patent law would also include laws related to the ownership of 
patents produced using funding from the Federal Government. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006). 
Under a narrower interpretation, however, patent law includes only the laws related to the 
availability, scope, and enforcement of exclusive rights created by patents. This Article uses this 
narrower meaning of patent law. 
 46. Robert C. Bird, Law, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 61, 64 
(2011) (“[T]he notion that law may be a source of competitive advantage remains largely 
unexplored.”). 
 47. Surden, supra note 44, at 1743; see, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT 
CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 7–8 (2009) (examining the costs and benefits of 
patents); ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 13 
(5th ed. 2010) (“Patent law provides a market-drive incentive to invest in innovation, by allowing 
the inventor to appropriate the full economic rewards of her invention.”); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., 
High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:  Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent 
Survey, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1255, 1283 (2009) (stating that “the patent monopoly is most 
commonly justified on the ground of providing incentives to innovate”); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante 
Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004) (“The 
traditional economic justification for intellectual property is well known. Ideas are public goods: 
they can be copied freely and used by anyone who is aware of them without depriving others of 
their use.”); see also Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 357–58, 377 
(2010). 
 48. In the few instances in which scholars have analyzed distributive concerns, the focus is on 
distributive justice. For example, scholars have examined the impact of patent law on racial 
minorities, Shubha Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual Property 
7
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domestic inventors more than foreign inventors, U.S. patent law may affect 
the competitiveness of American firms in global markets—for better or for 
worse. This Article thus begins to fill this void in the literature by 
considering the relative effects of U.S. patent law incentives to invent for 
domestic and foreign inventors.49 
This Article makes three contributions to the scholarship regarding 
patent law and global competition. First, it applies competition analysis to 
patent law, highlighting the importance of competitive considerations in an 
increasingly global economy. Second, this Article evaluates whether patent 
law can use three mechanisms to increase U.S. incentives to invent relative 
to foreign inventors: (1) protectionist patent laws, (2) patent laws that 
improve the processing of patent applications by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, and (3) patent laws that support a culture in the United 
States that fosters innovation. From these perspectives, this Article 
assesses the capacity of the recent America Invents Act to boost U.S. 
inventiveness, and concludes that the law likely will provide little 
enhanced incentive for U.S. invention. Finally, by identifying limitations of 
U.S. patent law in fostering domestic competitive advantage, this Article 
highlights the importance of considering alternate approaches to boosting 
U.S. competitiveness.  
Following this Introduction, this Article proceeds in five parts. Part II 
assesses the importance of relative incentives to invent. It considers 
whether the United States must “out-innovate every other country on 
Earth”50 in order to obtain economic prosperity, and it examines the current 
invention and innovation capacity of the United States vis-à-vis other 
countries. That Part concludes that relative levels of invention and 
innovation between the United States and other countries are important to 
U.S. economic prosperity and that the United States’ capacity to invent 
likely has diminished compared to other countries. Part III analyzes 
whether protectionist patent law can effectively increase domestic 
incentives to invent and concludes that this approach should be avoided 
because it would ultimately undermine American prosperity. Part IV 
examines whether U.S. patent law can provide American inventors and 
businesses with relatively enhanced incentives to invent by improving the 
                                                                                                                     
Policy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 416 (2008), and developing countries, Jerome H. Reichman, 
Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 
46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1120 (2009). 
 49. Conversely, nonlegal commentators focusing on competition issues have occasionally 
asserted that patent law is important to American economic prosperity but have not analyzed 
whether U.S. patent law can help American inventors be more productive than their foreign 
counterparts. See, e.g., AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 67; ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 171 (asserting 
that the U.S. patent system should be reformed); KAO, supra note 12, at 232; INNOVATE AMERICA, 
supra note 11, at 68–70; NAT’L ECONOMIC COUNCIL, ET AL., supra note 2, at 8; GATHERING STORM, 
REVISITED, supra note 12, at 57. 
 50. President Obama, supra note 39.  
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processing of patent applications by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
That Part concludes that typical approaches to improving patent 
examination, like the America Invents Act, will have little effect on 
American inventors, at least vis-à-vis foreign inventors. Part V examines 
whether U.S. patent law can relatively increase U.S. incentives to invent 
through a less traditional use of law: using patent law to promote social 
norms and values among Americans that contribute to invention and 
innovation. That Part concludes that the expressive impact of patent law 
may help but the magnitude of this effect is unclear. Part VI concludes by 
summarizing and by identifying additional avenues for research. In 
particular, given the obstacles to using U.S. patent law to create 
competitive advantage in inventing, other areas of law may be better tools 
to help U.S. companies and inventors compete in a global marketplace.  
I.  U.S. INNOVATION AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 
A.  The Importance of Out-Innovating the World 
Innovation is unquestionably vital to the American economy.51 The 
U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that innovation produced almost 
75% of the growth in the U.S. economy since World War II.52 Similarly, 
economists contend that as much as 80% of growth in the gross domestic 
economy stems from the introduction of new technologies.53 But is 
President Obama correct that the United States must “out-innovate . . . the 
rest of the world”?54  
In one sense, President Obama may be overstating the importance of 
superlative innovation. Countries that “out-innovate” the United States 
may enjoy greater economic growth than the United States, but second-rate 
economic growth may still be significant. Moreover, the United States may 
gain from economic prosperity in foreign countries.55 U.S. consumers 
                                                                                                                     
 51. In this Article, innovation is “defined broadly, to include both improvements in 
technology and better methods or ways of doing things.” PORTER, supra note 12, at 45. 
 52. ARTI RAI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING INNOVATION, 
PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS 2 (2010). Other estimates are 
lower, but still significant. See INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 36 (stating that “economists 
estimate [that innovation] has accounted for half of U.S. GDP growth over the past 50 years”); see 
also ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 142 (“The growth of the U.S. economy has become dependent on the 
small, innovative companies that have thrived for decades in places like Silicon Valley.”). 
 53. KAO, supra note 12, at 21–22; see Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the 
Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312, 320 (1957) (finding that 
technological change accounted for 87.5% of increases in labor productivity between 1909 and 
1949). For his work regarding innovation and economic growth, Robert Solow won the 1987 Nobel 
Prize in Economics. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 
1987, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/ (last 
visited on Mar. 2, 2013). 
  54. President Obama, supra note 39. 
 55. See ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 155 (asserting that global economic growth will promote 
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“may benefit from lower import prices and a greater variety of imports,”56 
and U.S. citizens may be able to invest in foreign companies.57 “Similarly, 
a prosperous world will provide more potential customers for U.S. 
products and cheaper and more diverse products for U.S. consumers.”58 
However, two considerations indicate that President Obama may be correct 
that unsurpassed domestic innovation is important to the United States.  
First, innovation affects the capacity of domestic companies59 to 
compete successfully against foreign rivals.60 “Prosperity is not necessarily 
a zero-sum game, but there will inevitably be winners and losers.”61 As 
more markets become global, domestic businesses face greater pressure 
from international competition.62 “[F]irms gain and sustain competitive 
advantage in international competition through improvement, innovation, 
and upgrading.”63 This process of improving goods and services is ongoing 
because the advantages of today’s products are superseded by tomorrow’s 
innovations.64 Recent experience in the music industry illustrates the 
importance of innovation. Few people today buy vinyl records,65 and even 
                                                                                                                     
U.S. economic prosperity); KAO, supra note 12, at 242–43 (asserting that “what is good for the 
world is good for the United States”); PORTER, supra note 12, at 30; Thomas L. Friedman, What 
Goes Around…, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/26/opinion/what-
goes-around.html (“What goes around comes around, and also benefits Americans.”). 
 56. Mary Amiti & Kevin Stiroh, Is the United States Losing Its Productivity Advantage?, 13 
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 1, 1 (2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/ 
current_issues/ci13-8.html; see also Catherine Rampell, ‘Made in China,’ but Still Profiting 
Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/made-in-
china-but-still-profiting-americans/ (noting that domestic businesses profit from the sale of 
imports). 
 57. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & MANDELBAUM, supra note 29, at 28–29 (discussing American 
investment in companies in India). 
 58. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 20. 
 59. Admittedly, it is difficult to clearly identify which businesses are “U.S. businesses.” See 
id. at 26; Pisano & Shih, supra note 12, at 8. Some businesses may be located in the United States 
but owned by foreign investors. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 26. For simplicity, “U.S. business” in 
this Article refers to a business that contributes to the U.S. GDP. Foreign businesses contribute to 
the American economy. Pisano & Shih, supra note 12, at 8. There may, however, be particularly 
significant economic benefits to a country when a foreign business locates its headquarters in that 
country. See PORTER, supra note 12, at 69–70 (“The home base is where strategy is set, core 
products and process development takes place, and the essential and proprietary skills reside.”).  
 60. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 17, 20. 
 61. Id. at 20; accord GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 19. 
 62. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 1 (“The aviation and telecommunication revolutions 
have conspired to make distance increasingly irrelevant.”). 
 63. PORTER, supra note 12, at 70; accord GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 43. 
 64. See PORTER, supra note 12, at 50–51. 
 65. Recently, sales of vinyl records have increased, perhaps because of their high sound 
quality. Eliot Van Buskirk, Vinyl May Be Final Nail in CD’s Coffin, WIRED (Oct. 29, 2007), 
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/commentary/listeningpost/2007/10/listeningpost_1029. 
Nevertheless, sales of vinyl records are miniscule compared to compact discs (CDs) and internet 
downloads. See 2010 Year-End Shipment Statistics, RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., http://76.74. 
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CD sales are declining as online sales of music have increased.66 A music 
company that fails to adjust to these technological changes cannot 
compete. More generally, American companies must innovate in global 
markets, or they will lose market share.67 In the face of declining market 
share, those non-innovating U.S. companies will employ fewer American 
workers and pay less in U.S. taxes.68  
Domestic innovation also affects the global competitiveness of U.S. 
workers, and “[t]he possession of quality jobs is the foundation of a high 
quality life for the nation’s citizenry.”69 Unfortunately, many U.S. jobs are 
in jeopardy.70 By one estimate, nearly a third of all jobs in the United 
States could potentially be exported to foreign workers.71 This offshoring is 
particularly likely because foreign labor, both skilled and unskilled, is often 
far cheaper than American labor.72 For example, “eight engineers can be 
hired in India for the cost of one in the United States. Five chemists can be 
employed in China for the cost of one in the United States.”73 Advances in 
                                                                                                                     
24.142/548C3F4C-6B6D-F702-384C-D25E2AB93610.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
 66. In 2010 alone, CD sales dropped more than 20%; in contrast, downloads of music 
increased significantly. See 2010 Year-End Shipment Statistics, supra note 65.   
 67. Not all innovations significantly affect market share. For example, if Honda develops an 
innovative new latch for a car door, Ford may not lose significant market share. Consumers may not 
consider the innovation significant enough to adjust their buying habits. Similarly, other aspects of 
a product, such as brand recognition, may overshadow even substantial innovations.  
 68. See GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 5, 17–18. Promoting innovation may 
not guarantee that the United States will be a good place for all businesses. Countries that promote 
innovation might be well-suited for research and development functions but not manufacturing. For 
example, Apple received a great deal of attention for its innovations, but Apple employs only about 
50,000 people. See Zakaria, supra note 4. In contrast, Foxconn, which produces many of Apple’s 
products, employs 1,000,000 people. Id. Nevertheless, promoting innovation will help the U.S. 
economy even if some aspects of a business remain tied to foreign economies. If research and 
development functions are conducted in the United States, the U.S. economy will benefit more than 
if those activities were located in other countries. 
 69. GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 2.  
 70. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 65–66 (explaining that American businesses can thrive 
by outsourcing while U.S. workers become unemployed). 
 71. Alan S. Blinder, How Many US Jobs Might Be Offshorable?, 10 WORLD ECON. 41, 69 
(2009) (estimating that “between 22% and 29% of all of the jobs in the 2004 US workforce” could 
be “offshored”). Investing in foreign companies will not sufficiently offset domestic losses because 
nearly half of all Americans do not invest in stocks. Dennis Jacobe, In U.S., 54% Have Stock 
Market Investments, Lowest Since 1999, GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147 
206/Stock-Market-Investments-Lowest-1999.aspx. 
 72. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 28–29. 
 73. Id. at 28. If U.S. workers are less innovative than workers in other countries, even U.S. 
companies may outsource their research and development to centers in foreign countries. See id. at 
63 (reporting that “only 41% of the global corporations responding to a recent survey ranked the 
United States as an ‘attractive’ location for new R&D facilities, compared with 62% for China”); 
KAO, supra note 12, at 39 (“More than 40 percent of our high-tech companies invest in substantial 
R&D operations overseas, and at least a third of them are intent upon increasing their foreign stakes 
in R&D capability.”). This approach to innovation for U.S. companies may be short-sighted, 
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technology that enhance the productivity of U.S. workers may protect these 
U.S. jobs from international outsourcing. Furthermore, innovation can 
generate new employment opportunities in the United States because “the 
creation of new, high-quality jobs is today disproportionately dependent 
upon advances in science and engineering.”74  
The second reason that superlative innovation is important to the U.S. 
economy is that exceptional economic growth is necessary to “sustain[] the 
lifestyle which has come to be enjoyed—and expected—by America’s 
citizenry.”75 U.S. citizens are some of the wealthiest people on the planet. 
Among developed countries, the United States has the second highest 
median household income.76 To maintain these exceptional income levels, 
American businesses and workers must compete effectively in global 
markets, and domestic innovation is critical to that competition.77 In the 
words of one commentator, “What’s at stake is nothing less than the future 
prosperity and security of our nation.”78 
B.  Current U.S. Innovation Performance 
Although measuring innovation is difficult,79 it does not appear that the 
United States is “out-innovat[ing] . . . the rest of the world.”80 The 
Introduction highlighted a number of troubling facts regarding U.S. 
innovation. Other measures also indicate problems. For example, economic 
analysts have compiled global innovation rankings that rely on multiple 
factors related to innovation, and the rankings of the United States in these 
studies are disquieting.81 The Information Technology and Innovation 
                                                                                                                     
however, because innovation “thrives in face-to-face interactions and in fruitful collaborations 
among engineering, marketing, and management.” ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 138; accord KAO, supra 
note 12, at 40–41. Businesses likewise benefit when their research and development sectors are 
close to their marketing and manufacturing centers. See PORTER, supra note 12, at 93. 
 74. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 15; accord GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 
18. 
 75. GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 41. 
 76. OECD, SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2011: OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS 43 (2011). 
 77. See Pisano & Shih, supra note 12, at 2; Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic 
Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1661, 1698 (1990) (noting that “the ‘required’ 
number of inventions for a steady positive rate of growth in productivity has also to grow”). 
 78. KAO, supra note 12, at 3. 
 79. See Michael E. Porter & Scott Stern, Innovation: Location Matters, 42 MIT SLOAN 
MGMT. REV. 28, 31 (2001) (“Of course, no single measure of innovation is ideal.”). 
 80.  President Obama, supra note 1.  
 81. See ROBERT D. ATKINSON & SCOTT M. ANDES, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., 
THE ATLANTIC CENTURY II: BENCHMARKING EU & U.S. INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS,  20–23 
(2011), available at http://www.itif.org/files/2011-atlantic-century.pdf; EUROPEAN BUSINESS 
SCHOOL, THE INNOVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010–2011: INNOVATION AS A DRIVER OF 
PRODUCTIVITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH x–xi (Augusto López-Claros ed., 2011), available at http:/ 
/www.innovationfordevelopmentreport.org/papers/ICIrankings2010_11.pdf; JAMES P. ANDREW ET 
AL., INNOVATION 2010: A RETURN TO PROMINENCE—AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW WORLD ORDER  
12
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Foundation recently released a study comparing the innovative capacity of 
forty different countries.82 The study considered sixteen factors to measure 
innovation capacity in each country, including the number of science and 
technology researchers; the amount of capital invested in research; the 
number of scholarly publications; the availability of technological 
infrastructure such as high-speed Internet; tax rates; gross domestic product 
per working-age adult; and worker productivity.83  The study concluded 
that the United States ranked fourth, behind Singapore, Finland, and 
Sweden.84 Most alarming, however, was the study’s consideration of 
investment in innovation in the past twelve years. In that comparison, the 
United States ranked an abysmal thirty-ninth in research and forty-third 
overall.85 Another multifactor analysis of innovation ranked the United 
States fifth in the world in 2011.86 Similarly, in a 2010 Boston Consulting 
Group report identifying new, innovative companies, six out of seven 
companies were from outside the United States.87 Likewise, a report by the 
Economist evaluated the capacity of different countries to capitalize on 
information technologies and ranked the United States third.88  
Patents provide another gauge of the innovation output of different 
countries. A patent gives a person the exclusive right to use a new 
technology in the country that issued the patent. For example, a U.S. patent 
gives its owner the exclusive right to make, use, sell, and offer for sale an 
invention in the United States.89 These rights encourage an inventor to 
invest time and resources in developing new technology by allowing the 
inventor to obtain supracompetitive profits during the period of 
exclusivity.90 Because of the value of patents, important innovations are 
                                                                                                                     
17 (2010), available at http://tobiaslist.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/innovation-2010-bcg.pdf; see 
also ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DIGITAL ECONOMY RANKINGS 2010: BEYOND E-READINESS 3–4 
(2010), available at http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/gbs/bus/pdf/eiu_digital-economy-
rankings-2010_final_web.pdf (ranking the countries' digital development).  
 82. See ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 81, at 9.  
 83. Id. at 5. 
 84. Id. at 9. 
 85. See id. at 11. 
 86. See EUROPEAN BUSINESS SCHOOL, supra note 81, at x–xi.  
 87. See ANDREW ET AL., supra note 81, at 17. Three companies are from China, one is from 
Japan, one is from Taiwan, and one is from Brazil. Id.  
 88. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 81, at 2, 4. Some other studies evaluating U.S. 
innovation are more optimistic. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 
2010–2011 340 (Klaus Schwab ed., 2010) (ranking the United States first in “innovation” but 
fourth in overall “competitiveness”); INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 36 (“America today is a 
clear No. 1 in productive innovation.”). 
 89. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 90. See id. U.S. patents are particularly valuable because the United States economy is the 
largest market in the world according to GDP. See The World Factbook, Field Listing: GDP 
(Official Exchange Rate), CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
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frequently patented.91 Moreover, in many countries, patents provide data 
regarding the nationality of the inventor who obtained the patent. As a 
result, patent activity can serve as a proxy for the innovation output of 
different countries.92 Americans are not leading the world in patenting. For 
example, in 2011, Japanese inventors received 304,604 patents in various 
patent offices around the world.93 In contrast, American inventors received 
only 201,158 patents.94 This trend likely will continue, as Japanese 
inventors are also filing more patent applications than American inventors, 
although the gap may be narrowing:  In 2011, Japanese inventors outpaced 
their American counterparts by more than 40,000 patent applications.95 
U.S. inventors are even struggling to maintain dominance in the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office. Since 2008, foreign inventors have received 
more than 50% of the patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office.96 In 1963, foreign inventors accounted for just 18.6% of U.S. 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Indeed, patent numbers closely correlate with other measures of innovation. See Griliches, 
supra note 77, at 1673 (noting the “strong relationship between R&D and the number of patents 
received”); Porter & Stern, supra note 79, at 30. 
 92. Importantly, however, patents are only a proxy for innovation, and not a precise measure. 
First, some companies do not consider patents to be important for competition. See  Graham et al., 
supra note 47, 1290 fig. 1. Other forms of intellectual property, such as trade secrets, may protect 
inventions. Id. Second, even when inventions are patented, they may not be commercialized. 
Sichelman, supra note 47, at 343–44; see also Elizabeth Webster & Paul H. Jensen, Do Patents 
Matter for Commercialization?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 431, 431 (2011) (finding that “a patent grant had 
no effect on the decision to proceed with the commercialization process”); supra notes 42–44 and 
accompanying text. Indeed, some patents are invalid because they do not describe sufficiently new 
technology. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242–43 (2011). Some patents 
thus do not reflect innovation. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 44, at 259 n.4 (distinguishing 
between “invention” and “innovation”). Finally, even among patents that are commercialized, the 
number of patents that different industries obtain often varies. Other things being equal, inventors in 
patent-intensive industries will obtain more patents than inventors in other industries. As a result, 
differences in patent quantities between inventors from different countries may stem from one 
country’s economy involving more patent-intensive industries, rather than a difference in the 
capacity of the inventors from the countries to develop new, commercially significant ideas. Despite 
these concerns, patent counts can serve as a meaningful proxy for the number of inventions a 
country produces. See Griliches, supra note 77, at 1673, 1702 (arguing that “patents may indeed be 
a good indicator of unobserved inventive output”); Porter & Stern, supra note 79, at 31 (measuring 
innovative output by the number of patents granted). 
 93. Appendix A infra (tabulating patent and patent application data from the World 
Intellectual Property Organization). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96. See Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963–2011, 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (May 22, 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ 
ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf. When a patent issues to multiple inventors, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office only reports the nationality of the first inventor listed on the patent. Patent Tech. 
Monitoring Team, Patents By Country, State, and Year—Utility Patents (December 2011), U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/ 
cst_utl.htm.  On patents with both a foreign and a U.S. inventor, there is no reason to expect that the 
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patents.97 Matters are worse when adjusted for population. The United 
States is the third most populous country in the world.98 If innovation is to 
drive economic prosperity in the United States, then the United States 
likely will need more innovations than a less populous country.99 Among 
major patenting countries in 2011, the United States ranked ninth in 
patents per capita.100 Per capita, Japanese inventors received more than 
three times as many patents as U.S. inventors in 2011.101  
Thus, by many measures, the United States trails other countries in 
innovating.102 Indeed, many commentators argue that the United States is 
beginning to suffer from an “innovation gap.”103 In the words of one 
commentator, “America’s economy is in danger of losing what has always 
been our greatest competitive advantage: our genius for innovation.”104 
The remainder of this Article addresses whether U.S. patent law can help 
U.S. inventors close this gap by providing U.S. entities with enhanced 
incentives to invent vis-à-vis the incentives for foreign inventors.    
                                                                                                                     
foreign inventor will be listed first more frequently than the U.S. inventor. As a result, if the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office were to track the nationalities of all inventors, the ratio of foreign to 
domestic inventors would probably remain unchanged. See also infra note 340 (discussing similar 
issues for patent statistics reported by the World Intellectual Property Organization). 
 97. Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963–2011,  supra 
note 96. 
 98. Population 2011, World Development Indicators Database, THE WORLD BANK, available 
at http://databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/POP.pdf. 
 99. GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 46 (arguing that “the size of the 
economy to be maintained affects the size of the effort needed for its maintenance”). Per capita 
patent figures favor countries in which much of the industry is focused on technologically 
sophisticated industries. For example, if every employable citizen in a country were in a 
technologically sophisticated industry, the citizenry of such a country would produce more patents 
on a per capita basis than a country where only a handful of people are focused on developing new 
technology.  
 100. See Appendix A infra (calculating patents per capita and patent applications per capita 
using figures from the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Bank). Similarly, for 
per capita patent application in 2011, the United States ranked tenth. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 37 (noting that “we now face much more serious 
competitive challenges from new centers of innovation across an increasingly interconnected 
planet”). 
 103. E.g., ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 4–5 (arguing that America “has lost the core values that 
were the catalysts of its [innovation] success”); KAO, supra note 12, at 2 (asserting that America’s 
“capacity for innovation is eroding”); INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 38; Lechleiter, supra 
note 4 (stating that “America’s economy is in danger of losing what has always been our greatest 
competitive advantage: our genius for innovation”); see also AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 4 
(stating that “America is rapidly losing its competitive position”).  
 104. Lechleiter, supra note 4; accord Daniel McGinn, The Decline of Western Innovation: 
Why America Is Falling Behind and How to Fix It, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 2009, at 34 (stating that in 
a 2009 survey, only 41% of Americans stated that the United States “is staying ahead of China on 
innovation”).  
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II.  PROTECTIONISM AND U.S. PATENT LAW 
One potential mechanism for using U.S. patent law to give American 
companies and American inventors relatively enhanced incentives to 
invent would be for U.S. patent law explicitly to favor American interests 
in awarding and enforcing patents. For example, federal law could require 
that the U.S. Patent Office prioritize the review of applications from 
American inventors, apply more lenient standards when examining patent 
applications filed by American citizens, or charge different application fees 
depending on inventor nationality. U.S. patent law could also be facially 
neutral but still discriminate against foreign inventors. For instance, U.S. 
patent law could deny patent protection for inventions that lacked domestic 
manufacturing in the United States. These types of protectionist patent 
laws might help domestic innovators obtain patents and thus might 
increase the returns on investments in innovation in the United States.  
This Part examines the capacity of U.S. patent law to implement a 
protectionist agenda, and begins by examining the extent to which U.S. 
patent law historically has embraced protectionism. Next, this Part 
examines the extent to which international treaties prevent the United 
States from enacting protectionist patent law and determines that the 
United States would risk international sanctions if it were to return to its 
protectionist past. Finally, in light of these risks, this Part considers 
whether implementing protectionist patent law would make domestic firms 
more innovative than their foreign rivals.  
A.  Protectionist Roots in U.S. Patent Law 
In the past, U.S. patent law was often explicitly protectionist. For 
example, under the Patent Act of 1793, U.S. patents could only issue to “a 
citizen or citizens of the United States.”105 In 1800, Congress amended the 
Patent Act to extend patent eligibility to foreign inventors, but only if those 
inventors resided in America for two years and took an oath of their 
intention to become United States citizens.106 For more than forty years, 
the United States offered no patent protection to the discoveries of 
nonresident foreign inventors, so that “foreign inventions could be 
introduced to America without the additional cost of the inventor’s 
monopoly rights.”107 In 1836, Congress amended the Patent Act to allow 
nonresident foreign inventors to obtain U.S. patents,108 but simultaneously 
introduced a protectionist scheme of patent application fees. The fee 
                                                                                                                     
 105. Patent Act of 1793 § 1, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–19. 
 106. S. REP. NO. 24-239 (1836), available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/ 
Senate_Report_for_Bill_No_293.pdf.  
 107. Susan Sell, Intellectual Property and Public Policy in Historical Perspective: 
Contestation and Settlement, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 267, 286 (2004) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  
 108. Patent Act of 1836 § 8, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 120.  
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schedule required that a U.S. citizen pay $30 to file a patent application, a 
“subject of the King of Great Britain” pay $500, and any other nonresident 
noncitizen pay $300 to file an application for a U.S. patent.109 Protectionist 
application fees remained in place until 1870, when Congress established 
uniform fees for all patent applicants regardless of nationality or 
residency.110  
Even after the elimination of discriminatory fees, U.S. patent law 
retained protectionist elements, particularly in addressing concurrent 
invention by American and foreign inventors. For instance, the Patent Act 
of 1870 established a “caveat” system that, until 1903, was only available 
to U.S. citizens and foreign inventors who “resided in the United States 
one year next preceding the filing of [their] caveat[s], and made oath[s] of 
[their] intention[s] to become . . . citizen[s].”111 Under this system, an 
inventor could file with the Patent Office an abbreviated patent application 
called a “caveat” that would serve as a placeholder for a normal patent 
application. If another inventor later filed an application on the same 
invention, the first inventor could file a patent application, which the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office would treat as if it were filed on the date the 
inventor filed the caveat.112 The caveat thus preserved an inventor’s 
chronological priority while giving the inventor an opportunity to allow the 
“invention or discovery . . . to mature” into a commercially successful 
endeavor.113 If an invention did not prove commercially viable, an inventor 
who filed a caveat would have avoided the greater expense of filing a 
complete patent application.114  
Significant protectionist features of U.S. patent law existed as recently 
as 1994.115 Prior to that time, U.S. patent law favored American inventors 
over nonresident foreign inventors regarding the establishment of 
“invention dates.” For more than a century, certain issues in U.S. patent 
law depended on the date an invention was discovered. For example, an 
inventor could not obtain a patent if “the invention was . . . described in a 
printed publication . . . before the invention thereof [that is, before the 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Patent Act of 1836 § 9, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 121 (stating that a foreign inventor could 
avoid these heightened fees if he “ha[d] been resident in the United States for one 
year . . . and . . . made oath of his intention to become a citizen thereof”).  
 110. Patent Act of 1870 §§ 24–25 & 68, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 201, 209; see also Nuno Pires 
de Carvalho, The Primary Function of Patents, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 25, 43 n.90 (2001). 
 111. Patent Act of 1870 at § 40, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 204; The Patent Act of 1903 § 4, ch. 
1019, 32 Stat. 1225, 1227 (extending the caveat system to foreign, nonresident inventors). 
 112. Patent Act of 1870 § 40, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 203 (stating that by statute, a caveat would 
only protect an inventor for one year). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Patent Act of 1870 §§ 40, 68, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 203, 209 (showing that caveat 
applications were shorter than patent applications and also involved smaller fees).  
 115. See K. William Watson, Still a Protectionist Trade Remedy: The Case for Repealing 
Section 337, Policy Analysis no. 708, Cato Institute, Sept. 19, 2012, at 1, 5.  
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invention date].”116 Similarly, when two people discovered the same 
invention and both applied for patents, U.S. patent law awarded a patent 
only to the person with the earlier invention date, even if the first person to 
invent was the second person to apply for a patent.117 In determining dates 
of invention, U.S. patent law disfavored foreign inventors in that “an 
applicant for a patent . . . may not establish a date of invention by reference 
to . . . activity with respect thereto, in a foreign country.”118  
As a result, foreign, nonresident inventors usually could not establish 
invention dates that were earlier than the dates they filed U.S. patent 
applications because they performed the activities relevant to establishing 
the invention date in foreign jurisdictions.119 In contrast, most American 
inventors performed these activities within the United States. Because of 
this protectionist difference, a foreign inventor could fail to obtain a U.S. 
patent even if the foreign inventor discovered an invention before its 
American counterpart.120 The protectionist restrictions of this aspect of 
U.S. patent law significantly diminished over time. For example, in 1994, 
Congress amended the Patent Act so that inventive activity in foreign 
countries that are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) could 
be used to establish invention dates under U.S. patent law.121 For non-
WTO countries,122 this protectionist provision of U.S. patent law was not 
eliminated until 2011.123  
                                                                                                                     
 116. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); see also Patent Act of 1870 § 24, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 201 
(preventing a person from obtaining a patent on an invention that had been “described in any 
printed publication in this or any foreign country, before his invention or discovery thereof”). 
 117. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 625–26 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing 
invention dates). When determining which inventor was first, U.S. patent law defined the date of 
invention as the date that an idea was initially conceived, provided that the first person to conceive 
of an invention was diligent in reducing that conception to practice. See infra note 182 and 
accompanying text.  
 118. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 104, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 798. 
 119. See, e.g., Rousseau v. Brown, 21 App. D.C. 73, 79 (1903). 
 120. See id.  
 121. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. 5, 108 Stat. 4809, 4973–89 
(1994) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2006)). 
 122. At present, there are 157 countries that are members of the WTO. See Understanding the 
WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).  
 123. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(d), (n), 125 Stat. 287, 293 (2011). Some other provisions of U.S. 
law that are related to patent law arguably are still protectionist. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 204 
(2006) states that a small business or nonprofit organization that receives a patent for an invention 
discovered using federal funds shall not grant an exclusive license to use an invention in the United 
States unless the licensee “agrees that any products embodying the subject invention or produced 
through the use of the subject invention will be manufactured substantially in the United States.” As 
noted, this is not the type of law included in the term “patent law” for this Article. See supra note 
45. 
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B.  The Legality of Protectionist U.S. Patent Law 
U.S. patent law could favor U.S. interests by resurrecting the 
protectionism historically embraced by U.S. patent law. For example, the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office could examine patent applications filed 
by American inventors before applications filed by foreign inventors.124 
Similarly, Congress could require that foreign inventors pay larger filing 
fees. 
Such protectionist actions, however, would violate the terms of 
international treaties that the United States has joined. For example, in 
1887, the United States signed the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (Paris Convention).125 Article 2 of this treaty provides:  
The subjects or citizens of each of the contracting States shall enjoy, in 
all the other States of the Union, so far as concerns patents for 
inventions, trade or commercial marks, and the commercial name, the 
advantages that the respective laws thereof at present accord, or shall 
afterwards accord to subjects or citizens. In consequence they shall 
have the same protection as these latter, and the same legal recourse 
against all infringements of their rights, under reserve of complying 
with the formalities and conditions imposed upon subjects or citizens 
by the domestic legislation of each State.126 
Similarly, in 1994, the United States signed the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).127 Article 3 of 
TRIPs states that “[e]ach Member shall accord to the nationals of other 
                                                                                                                     
 124. Indeed, as recently as June 2010, the U.S. Patent Office proposed delaying the 
examination of many applications submitted by foreign inventors. Enhanced Examination Timing 
Control Initiative, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,764 (June 4, 2010). Specifically, the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office proposed regulations that would accelerate the examination of some patent applications 
while delaying the examination of others. Id. As part of a scheme, the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office recommended delaying the examination of any U.S. patent application that relied on a 
foreign patent application for a filing date. Id. At present, however, this part of the proposal has not 
been implemented. See Changes to Implement the Prioritized Examination Track (Track I) of the 
Enhanced Examination Timing Control Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,399 (Apr. 4, 2011) (to be 
codified at  37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (implementing part of the proposed changes but not the portion dealing 
with U.S. applications based on foreign patent applications). The Korean Intellectual Property 
Office objected to the proposed delay. Letter from Jeong-yeol Park, Director General, Electronic 
and Electric Examination Bureau, Korean Intellectual Property Office, to Robert L. Stoll, 
Commissioner for Patents, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/3track_kipo_20aug2010.pdf.   
 125. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372. 
 126. Id. at art. 2. The Paris Convention also prohibits some laws that are facially neutral but 
have differential impact on foreign inventors. For example, the Paris Convention states that “no 
requirement as to domicile . . . may be imposed.” Id.   
 127. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C to the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299 [hereinafter “TRIPs Agreement”]. 
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Members treatment no less favorable than that it accords its own nationals 
with regard to the protection of intellectual property.”128 Furthermore, 
under Article 27 of TRIPs, patent rights must be available “without 
discrimination as to the place of invention, . . . and whether products are 
imported or locally produced.”129 
Although these treaties appear to prohibit protectionist U.S. patent law, 
their effect is limited in two ways. First, Congress can repudiate these 
treaties by passing a contrary statute, like a protectionist provision of patent 
law. The U.S. Constitution declares that “all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land.”130 However, “Congress has the power, accepted since at 
least 1798, to terminate, or repudiate, treaty obligations altogether.”131 As 
an administrative agency, the power of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office to repudiate a treaty may be more limited than Congress’s. The U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office may nevertheless be able to embrace 
protectionism because of the second limit on the scope of these two 
treaties: They cannot be applied in U.S. courts. Treaties can only be 
judicially enforced if they are “self-executing,” in which case courts apply 
such treaties like federal statutes.132 If a treaty is held to be “non-self-
executing,” supporting federal legislation is required to give legal effect to 
the treaty’s provisions.133 Significantly, courts have generally held that the 
Paris Convention and TRIPs are not self-executing.134 As a result, if the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office were to implement a protectionist 
agenda, foreign inventors and businesses could not bring challenges in U.S. 
courts.135  
                                                                                                                     
 128. Id. at art. 3(1). “Protection” in this provision “shall include matters affecting the 
availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property rights.” Id. at 
art. 3 n.3. The antiprotectionist provisions of TRIPs and the Paris Convention overlap. John F. 
Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 685, 703 (2002). 
 129. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 127, at art. 27(1). 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 131. Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 587 (2007). 
 132. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 161 n.21 (2d Cir. 2007); Wu, supra note 131, 
at 578.  
 133. Wu, supra note 131, at 579–80. Determining whether a treaty is self-executing is a 
complicated analysis involving many factors. Id. 
 134. ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 161 (holding that TRIPs is not self-executing); In re Rath, 402 F.3d 
1207, 1210–11 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Int’l Café, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Café Int’l, Inc., 252 F.3d 
1274, 1277 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Paris Convention is not self-executing); Caveats 
for Patents for Inventions, 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 273, 275–76 (1889) (holding that there are classes of 
treaties that are not self-executing). But see Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 
(2d Cir.1956) (stating in dicta that the Paris Convention is self-executing). 
 135. For example, in 1889 a Swiss inventor challenged under the Paris Convention the 
provision of U.S. patent law barring nonresident foreign inventors from filing caveats. Caveats for 
Patents for Inventions, 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 273, 274–75 (1889). In a published opinion, the U.S. 
Attorney General agreed that the Paris Convention conflicted with U.S. patent law but nevertheless 
held that the Paris Convention “requires legislation to render it effective for the modification of 
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Although these treaties provide little obstacle to protectionism under 
federal law, they may nonetheless be enforced through international 
enforcement mechanisms. The Paris Convention provides that “[a]ny 
dispute between two or more countries . . . concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention, not settled by negotiation, may, by any one 
of the countries concerned, be brought before the International Court of 
Justice.”136 Under TRIPs, a foreign country could initiate enforcement 
proceedings in the World Trade Organization.137 In fact, the United States 
has initiated numerous dispute resolution proceedings under TRIPs.138 In 
some instances, the United States has used WTO enforcement mechanisms 
to attack protectionist patent laws of other countries.139 Similarly, another 
country could use the enforcement mechanisms of the WTO and TRIPs to 
oppose protectionist patent law in the United States, and a successful 
challenge to protectionist U.S. patent law would entitle the prevailing 
country to enact retaliatory measures.140  
C.  Policy Concerns with Protectionism 
Although the United States might incur international sanctions for 
returning U.S. patent law to its protectionist roots, the United States has the 
ability to do so. If the domestic benefits of protectionism outweigh the 
costs, protectionist patent law might increase American prosperity. 
                                                                                                                     
existing [U.S. patent] laws.” Id. at 279. 
 136. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 28(1), Sept. 28, 1979 (as 
amended).  
 137. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 127, at art. 64; see also Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 23, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994) 
[hereinafter Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement] (describing WTO dispute resolution 
proceedings). Because TRIPs incorporates the antiprotectionist provisions of the Paris Convention, 
an aggrieved country could also invoke WTO dispute resolution mechanisms to address a violation 
of Article 2 of the Paris Convention. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 127, art. 2(1). 
 138. See Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, Disputes by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A26#selected_ 
agreement (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).  
 139. For example, in May 2000, the United States initiated proceedings against Brazil because 
Brazil’s patent laws stated that a patent was subject to compulsory licensing if the subject matter of 
the patent was not manufactured in Brazil. Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil—
Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000). Although facially neutral, such 
a provision favors Brazilian industries because they are naturally more likely to manufacture 
products in Brazil. The United States argued that this provision of Brazilian patent law violated the 
prohibition in TRIPs of “discrimination regarding the availability of patents and the enjoyment of 
patent rights on the basis of whether products are imported or locally produced.” Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent Protection, 
WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001). After the WTO constituted a panel to resolve the issue, the United 
States and Brazil settled. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting 
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4 (July 19, 2001). 
 140. Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 137, at art. 23. 
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However, protectionism likely would not increase American innovation.  
In general, governments eschew protectionism because it is 
economically inefficient.141 For example, if tariffs on imported goods 
prevent foreign businesses from selling equivalent products at lower prices 
than domestic rivals, then those tariffs actually create economic losses.142 
Protectionism nevertheless might be defended on the theory that, even if it 
reduces global economic prosperity, it increases domestic prosperity 
because it protects domestic manufacturers.143 For example, if Chinese 
companies can more cheaply manufacture computers than U.S. businesses, 
U.S. tariffs on Chinese computers might help some domestic 
manufacturers, at least in the short term.144 However, for almost two 
hundred years, economists have argued that protectionism reduces 
domestic prosperity.145 In general, protectionist tariffs on imports raise 
prices and thus create deadweight losses, in part because some domestic 
consumers cannot afford to pay the higher prices.146 Protectionism also 
reduces domestic prosperity by insulating domestic businesses from the 
competitive pressures that lead to the development of superior products 
and services.147 As John Stuart Mill argued in 1848, protectionist tariffs 
“render the labour and capital of the country less efficient in production 
than they would otherwise be.”148  
For these same reasons, even if protectionist patent law might increase 
the incentives for American inventors to discover new ideas, it likely 
would undermine American innovation. For example, if protectionist 
patent law increased the price of inventions in the United States, some U.S. 
consumers and U.S. businesses would be unable to afford these increased 
prices. Protectionist patent laws would also shield American inventors 
from competitive pressures that spur innovation, and American inventors 
                                                                                                                     
 141. Duffy, supra note 128, at 702; John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World 
Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 521 (2000). 
 142. NIGEL GRIMWADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: A CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS 22–24 
(1996).  
 143. Certainly, politicians who promote protectionism often claim to be helping domestic 
industries. 
 144. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 141, at 522 (noting that “free trade does not 
make everyone within a nation better off, at least in the short term”). See generally DOUGLAS A. 
IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE 92 (1996).  
 145. IRWIN, supra note 144, at 93 (“All the leading economists of the first half of the 
nineteenth century—James Mill, David Ricardo, Robert Torrens, John Stuart Mill, John Ramsay 
McCulloch, Nassau Senior, to mention but the most eminent—wrote . . . in favor of free trade and 
stood in virtual unanimity against protectionist import duties.”). 
 146. GRIMWADE, supra note 142, at 24. Protectionism regarding innovation may increase 
domestic welfare if domestic innovation “has important spillover effects on other sectors of the 
economy.” Id. at 32. Even in this situation, however, a direct subsidy of domestic innovation would 
be better than protectionist patent law. Id.   
 147. PORTER, supra note 12, at 30. 
 148. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 917 (1909). 
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might actually become less innovative.149 Finally, protectionist U.S. patent 
law might also undermine domestic prosperity by prompting other 
countries to enact their own protectionist measures.150 Indeed, as described 
above, protectionist U.S. patent law would violate TRIPs, and the WTO’s 
dispute resolution procedures encourage aggrieved countries to address 
violations through action in “the same sector(s) as that in which . . . [there 
has been] a violation.”151   
III.  TYPICAL APPROACHES TO IMPROVING U.S. PATENT OFFICE 
PROCEDURES 
Protectionism is not the only way that law can help American 
companies and inventors compete against foreign rivals. Protectionism 
shields domestic businesses from competitive forces in the naïve hope of 
increasing domestic prosperity. Sometimes, however, domestic entities 
outperform their foreign rivals simply because they are better able to 
compete in global markets. Such innovators have a “competitive 
advantage” over their rivals.152 More specifically, a competitive advantage 
is “a value-creating strategy using firm resources to improve a firm’s 
efficiency or effectiveness in ways not in use by current or potential 
competitors.”153  
Many factors contribute to competitive advantage, including law.154 For 
example, federal law governs the use of the airwaves for radio 
transmissions throughout the United States.155 If the federal government 
were to make more bandwidth available for commercial use, innovators 
                                                                                                                     
 149. PORTER, supra note 12, at 30.   
 150. Of course, the extent to which foreign governments and researchers retaliate against U.S. 
inventors depends upon the nature of U.S. protectionist measures. Some protectionist measures may 
be less inflammatory than others. 
 151. Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 137, at art. 22.  Protectionist U.S. 
patent law thus may undermine the efforts of U.S. inventors to obtain foreign patents. Importantly, 
foreign patents provide U.S. inventors with significant returns: from 1995 to 2009, U.S. inventors 
obtained approximately 41% of their patents in foreign jurisdictions. See Econ. and Statistics Div., 
Patent Grants by Country of Origin and Patent Office (1995-2010), WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP. 
ORG., (Dec., 2011), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/xls/wipo_ 
pat_grant_by_origin_office_table.xls.  
 152. See generally PORTER, supra note 12, at 129–30 (describing competitive advantage in 
global markets). 
 153. Bird, supra note 46, at 71. 
 154. See PORTER, supra note 12, at 70 (noting that certain conditions encourage “firms [to] 
improve and innovate and continue to do so faster and in the proper directions compared to their 
international rivals”). See generally MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INVENTION 326–30 (1996) (discussing ways to increase “the 
proportion of people showing the traits of creativity”); Bird, supra note 46, at 71–76, 78–80 
(modeling the determinates of competitive advantage in global markets). 
 155. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (empowering the Federal Communications Commission to 
regulate “communication by wire and radio”). 
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located in the United States might be better able to develop new wireless 
technologies than foreign counterparts operating in countries where less 
bandwidth is available for innovation.156 A change in the regulation of the 
airwaves therefore might encourage domestic competitive advantage 
without protectionist side effects.157 Importantly, unlike protectionism, 
laws that create competitive advantage for domestic businesses do not 
reduce domestic or global prosperity.158 Instead, laws that promote U.S. 
competitive advantage increase global welfare and simultaneously enable 
the United States to capture a greater share of global markets.159  
As described above, patent law is closely related to competition.160 
Valuable patent rights encourage firms and individuals to discover new 
inventions, and new ideas are central to success in international 
competition.161 This Part assesses whether U.S. patent laws can provide 
American entities with competitive advantages by creating relatively 
enhanced incentives for these entities to invent.   
A.  Examples 
In the past, some simple aspects of U.S. patent law have provided 
American companies and inventors with enhanced incentives to invent 
without being protectionist. One example is the use of the English 
language by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. American inventors are 
more likely to speak English than foreign inventors, who may face 
significant translation costs both in understanding U.S. patent laws and in 
drafting U.S. patent applications.162 Cheaper access to U.S. patents likely 
                                                                                                                     
 156. Indeed, the Federal Communications Commission recently required changes to television 
broadcasts in part to “allow[] some of the spectrum to be auctioned to companies that will be able to 
provide consumers with more advanced wireless services (such as wireless broadband).” Learn 
About DTV: Frequently Asked Questions, DTV.GOV, http://www.dtv.gov/consumercorner.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2013). But see PORTER, supra note 12, at 82–83 (discussing the impact of 
overcoming shortcomings on innovation). 
 157. Law can also create competitive disadvantages through restrictive regulations. For 
example, the German chemical company BASF recently announced plans to move a major research 
facility focusing on genetically modified organisms from Germany to the United States because 
“there is still a lack of acceptance for this technology in many parts of Europe—from the majority 
of consumers, farmers and politicians.” BASF to Concentrate Plant Biotechnology Activities on 
Main Markets in North and South America, BASF (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.basf.com/group/ 
pressrelease/P-12-109.  
 158. See PORTER, supra note 12, at 631 (discussing how policy that promotes innovation must 
also encompass competition, and how technological progress that addresses these concerns not only 
helps the technology industry, but the entire national industry as well).   
 159. Within some industries, the competitive advantages of foreign rivals may stem from 
economic conditions that are unique to that country that the United States cannot emulate.  PORTER, 
supra note 12, at 194–95. 
 160. See supra notes 42–49, 59–69 and accompanying text.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Patent applications may be filed “in a language other than English.” Patents, Trademarks, 
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provides American inventors with a small competitive advantage because 
U.S. patents—and only U.S. patents—provide exclusive rights to make, 
use, or sell an invention throughout the United States, which is the largest 
market in the world.163  
Similarly, in the past the existence and strength of U.S. patent law may 
have provided American inventors with a domestic competitive advantage 
because strong patent laws favor innovators over imitators, and American 
companies historically have been world-leading innovators.164 Without 
patent law, American businesses might not have been able to recover the 
investments required to develop new technologies.165 Foreign competitors 
could have copied American innovations and undercut American 
inventors’ prices because the foreign copies would not have needed to 
include development costs in their pricing.166 Based on such fears, the 
United States was a major proponent of international treaties, particularly 
TRIPs, that required all signatories to enact laws providing for robust 
patent rights.167 Countries whose citizens produce fewer inventions may 
benefit from weaker patent protection.168  
Today, these two sources of competitive advantage likely are eroding. 
The use of English in U.S. patent law may not provide significant 
competitive advantage in the near future because citizens of many 
                                                                                                                     
and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. § 1.52(d) (2011). Before a patent can be examined by the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office, however, a patent applicant must provide an English language translation of 
the application, a statement that the translation is accurate, and an additional processing fee. Id. 
 163. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 61. A foreign inventor may face lower costs in obtaining a 
foreign patent, but that patent is less valuable because it applies to a smaller market. Recent patent 
activities in Europe demonstrate the potential impact of foreign languages on competitive 
advantage.  Europe lacks a unified patent system, despite widespread agreement that such a system 
would benefit Europe. See Joe Kirwin, Much Celebrated Breakthrough on EU’s Patent System 
Proves to Be a Bit Premature, 84 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 401 (2012). For years, 
disagreements among European countries regarding the official languages to be used in a unified 
patent system have blocked unification efforts.  Id.  Recently, the European Commission proposed a 
unified patent system using only English, French, and German as languages, prompting Spain and 
Italy to object. Id. 
 164. See Duffy, supra note 128, at 695–96 (noting that countries with many innovators favor 
patent protection, while countries with many copyists do not). For a long time, U.S. inventors 
apparently obtained more patents than inventors from any other country in the world. Econ. & 
Statistics Div., Total Number of Patent Grants (1985–2009) by Resident and Non-Resident, WORLD 
INTELLLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/ (follow “Total number 
of patent grants (1985–2009) by resident and non-resident” hyperlink to XLS or CSV file) (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2013) (reporting patent grants by patent office, broken down by resident and 
nonresident from 1883–2009). 
 165. See William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 374–75 (2011) 
(discussing how inventors monetize their inventions). 
 166. MERGES ET AL., supra note 47, at 12. 
 167. Duffy, supra note 128, at 688, 695. 
 168. Id. at 695–96.  
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countries around the world are learning English.169 By one estimate, 
“China graduates more English-speaking engineers than the United 
States.”170 Moreover, the magnitude of any “English advantage” may be 
decreasing because U.S. patents soon may not be the most valuable type of 
patents in the world: “Between 2012 and 2020, China will pass the United 
States to become the largest consumer market in the world.”171 As a result, 
cheap access to Chinese patents may become as important as cheap access 
to U.S. patents. Similarly, strong U.S. patent law by itself may be 
insufficient to provide domestic competitive advantage because foreign 
inventors obtain many U.S. patents.172 In fact, in some technological areas, 
foreign inventors obtain more U.S. patents than U.S. inventors.173  
B.  Improving the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
Traditionally, patent scholars and policymakers attempt to improve the 
workings of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office by reducing (1) the cost 
and duration of the examination of patent applications and (2) the number 
of invalid patents174 issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.175 
Indeed, President Obama and the congressional supporters of the America 
Invents Act contend that the Act achieves all of the traditional types of 
improvements to the processes of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 
and that these improvements will increase American competitiveness in 
global markets.176 This Section reviews the alleged improvements to the 
procedures of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and analyzes whether 
these traditional types of improvements will provide American entities 
with enhanced incentives to invent vis-à-vis foreign inventors.177 
                                                                                                                     
 169. By some accounts, the number of English speakers in China will soon exceed the number 
of English speakers in the United States. John Gregg, Jon Huntsman says more English speakers in 
China than United States, POLITIFACT.COM (Aug. 19, 2011, 4:46 PM), http://www.politifact.com/tr 
uth-o-meter/statements/2011/aug/19/jon-huntsman/jon-huntsman-says-more-english-speakers-
china-unit/. 
 170. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 44.  
 171. Id. at 61. 
 172. See supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.  
 173. See infra note 219 (discussing technological areas in which foreign inventors obtain more 
U.S. patents than U.S. inventors). But see infra notes 209–12.  
 174. A U.S. patent can be invalid for many reasons. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03, 112. 
 175. For a sample of typical approaches to improving the processing of patent applications by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, see generally supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 176. Sen. Chris Coons, supra note 37; Sen. Franken: Long-Overdue Patent Reform Will 
Create U.S. Jobs, supra note 37; Sen. Patrick Leahy, Comment of Senator Leahy on the Senate 
Motion to Proceed to the America Invents Act, supra note 3; President Obama, supra note 39; Rep. 
Smith, supra note 4; see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ET AL., RISING ABOVE THE 
GATHERING STORM: ENERGIZING AND EMPLOYING AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER ECONOMIC FUTURE 
187–88 (2007) (arguing that the United States should shift to a first-to-file system to “increase the 
efficiency and predictability of the US system”).  
 177. The Act contains other provisions that may improve the speed and quality of patent 
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1.  Improvements in the America Invents Act 
The America Invents Act contains numerous, significant changes to 
U.S. patent law that are designed to reduce the cost and delay of obtaining 
a U.S. patent.178 For example, in previous years, some of the fees that the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office collected were used to support other 
parts of the Federal Government. The Act ensures that the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office will retain more of its fees.179 With more money, the 
Patent and Trademark Office can hire more patent examiners and purchase 
better equipment, thereby decreasing the time required to examine patent 
applications. The Act also reduces the cost of filing patent applications for 
certain inventors working for small businesses.180  
Perhaps the largest, potentially cost-saving, reform in the Act is the 
change from a “first-to-invent” system to a “first-to-file” system.181 Under 
the older first-to-invent system, important aspects of patent law depended 
upon the “invention date” for a discovery, which was defined as the date an 
inventor conceived of an idea, provided that the inventor was sufficiently 
diligent in reducing that conception to practice.182 For example, an inventor 
could not obtain a patent for a discovery that was “known or used by others 
in this country . . . before the invention thereof by the applicant for 
patent.”183 Similarly, when two separate inventors sought to obtain patents 
on the same discovery, the inventor with the earlier invention date would 
receive the patent.184 In contrast, for both of these issues, a first-to-file 
system uses the dates that inventors actually file patent applications, not 
the invention dates.185 Because an inventor conceives of an invention well 
before filing a patent application, the determinative dates in a first-to-
invent system are sometimes earlier than the corresponding dates under a 
first-to-file system.186 This difference in dates can affect both the validity 
                                                                                                                     
examination by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  
 178. See, e.g., Sen. Franken, supra note 37.   
 179. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 22, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).  
 180. Id. § 10 (providing reduced filing fees for applicants that are “micro entities”). 
 181. Id. § 3. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 102(g), with Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 3.  
 182. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 102(g). Conception occurs “‘when the inventor has a specific, 
settled idea, a particular solution to the problem at hand . . . .’” Creative Compounds, LLC v. 
Starmark Labs., 651 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr 
Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). “In order to establish an actual reduction to 
practice, the inventor must prove that: (1) he constructed an embodiment or performed a process 
that met all the limitations of the interference count; and (2) he determined that the invention would 
work for its intended purpose.” Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 183.  35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 184.  Id. §  102(g). 
 185. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). Even 
under the older first-to-invent system, some aspects of patent validity depended upon the filing date.  
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (referencing “the date of the application for patent”). 
 186. Under the old first-to-invent system, a patent applicant could use the patent application 
filing date as the constructive date of conception and reduction to practice. Solvay S.A. v. 
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and ownership of patents. For example, if a discovery was groundbreaking 
on the date of conception but common knowledge by the time the inventor 
filed a patent application, the inventor might be able to obtain a patent 
under a first-to-invent system but not under a first-to-file system.187 
Likewise, in a first-to-file system, the first person to file a patent 
application will have priority and receive the patent.188 The outcome may 
be different in a first-to-invent system, where the second person to file a 
patent application will receive the patent if she establishes an earlier 
conception date and demonstrates diligent reduction to practice.189  
Proponents of the shift to a first-to-file system argued that a first-to-file 
system was cheaper and faster to operate than a first-to-invent system in at 
least two respects.190 First, because conception and reduction to practice 
are fact-intensive issues, determining invention dates is complicated and 
expensive.191 For example, “[c]onception is complete only when the idea is 
so clearly defined in the inventor’s mind that only ordinary skill would be 
necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or 
experimentation.”192 As a result, determining conception requires detailed 
investigation into the “inventor’s mind,” the level of “ordinary skill,” and 
the difficulty of “reduc[ing] the invention to practice.”193 Moreover, much 
information regarding these issues is not publicly available, such as the 
inventor’s mental state prior to filing a patent application.  
Challenges in determining invention dates under the first-to-invent 
system can hamper the efforts of patent owners, patent examiners, and 
                                                                                                                     
Honeywell Int’l., Inc., 622 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 187. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (stating that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the 
invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for 
patent . . . .”); id. § 103 (“A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically 
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which said subject matter pertains.”). Under the America Invents Act, some public disclosures up to 
one year before the date a patent application is filed do not prevent an inventor from obtaining a 
patent. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 3. 
 188. The America Invents Act also establishes new “derivation proceedings” that prevent a 
person from obtaining a patent by copying an invention from an inventor and filing a patent 
application before that inventor files a patent application. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 3. 
Derivation proceedings, however, must be initiated “within the 1-year period beginning on the date 
of the first publication of a claim to an invention . . . .” Id.  
 189. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g); see also Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 629 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(awarding a patent to the first inventor to file a patent application because the second inventor to 
file an application was not diligent in reducing his prior conception to practice). 
 190. Alexander Poltorak, First-to-File vs. First-to-Invent, WEALTH OF IDEAS NEWSL., Oct. 
2007, at 40, available at http://www.generalpatent.com/ip_articles/Poltorak-IPToday-Apr2008.pdf.   
 191. Id.  
 192. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
 193. Id.  
28
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss2/1
2013] COMPETITIVE PATENT LAW 369 
 
competitors to assess the validity of a patent or patent application.194 
Likewise, near simultaneous inventors in a first-to-invent patent system 
may incur substantial costs in resolving competing claims to the same 
discovery.195 In contrast, determining priority dates in a first-to-file system 
is quick and inexpensive. Patent filing dates are easy to identify and 
published online.  
A second reason that a first-to-file system may be cheaper than a first-
to-invent system is that nearly every other patent office in the world uses a 
first-to-file system rather than a first-to-invent system.196 Consequently, 
proponents of the America Invents Act argued that the Act “would make it 
easier for U.S. inventors to get innovations patented overseas because they 
would not have to prepare applications for two different systems.”197  
The America Invents Act also contains numerous provisions designed 
to reduce the number of invalid patents issued by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office. For example, the America Invents Act creates a new 
process through which third parties can submit information “of potential 
relevance to the examination of [an] application,” including a statement 
explaining the relevance of the information.198 Prior to the Act, U.S. patent 
law allowed third parties to submit to the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office “patents or publications relevant to a pending published 
application” but prohibited third parties from including “any explanation of 
the patents or publications, or any other information.”199 Expanding the 
capacity of third parties to help the U.S. patent examiners evaluate patent 
applications may reduce the number of invalid patents that the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office issues.200 The America Invents Act also may 
improve the quality of U.S. patents by expanding the administrative 
procedures available to third parties for challenging the validity of issued 
U.S. patents. Even before the Act, a third party could challenge a U.S. 
patent’s validity through an administrative process known as 
reexamination, but U.S. patent law limited these proceedings in two 
significant respects.201 First, reexamination could only address “a 
                                                                                                                     
 194. See Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes—A Proposed Re-Definition of “First-to-
Invent,” 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 793 n.190 (1998).   
 195. Id. at 793.  
 196. Id. at 757. 
 197. Rep. Smith, supra note 4.  
 198. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
Submitted information must be in the form of “a patent application, any patent, published patent 
application, or other printed publication . . . .” Id. 
 199. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.99(a), (d) (2012); see also 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (providing that, for an 
issued U.S. patent, a third party may submit to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office “patents or 
printed publications” and a statement of their relevance to the validity of the U.S. patent).  
 200. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, PATENT REFORM IN 
THE 112TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES 19 (2011). 
 201. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–18 (2006). 
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substantial new question of patentability,” thus excluding any validity 
issues already considered in the initial examination of the patent.202 
Second, third parties could not raise certain types of validity challenges in 
reexaminations, such as asserting that a patent does not cover patent-
eligible technology.203 The America Invents Act creates a new “post-grant 
review” procedure that lacks both of these limitations.204 In a post-grant 
review, a third party will be able to assert any invalidity critique that could 
be made in federal court.205 Post-grant review proceedings, however, can 
only be initiated within nine months of a patent’s issuance.206 For 
challenges after this initial time period, the America Invents Act replaces 
the older reexamination procedures with a new administrative procedure 
called “inter partes review.”207 Like the older reexaminations, certain 
validity challenges cannot be raised in inter partes reviews, but in other 
respects inter partes reviews are broader than reexamination. Significantly, 
inter partes reviews are not limited to “substantial new question[s] of 
patentability” like reexaminations; instead, third parties can raise, in inter 
partes reviews, some validity issues that were already considered in the 
initial examination of the patent.208 
2.  The Impact of Traditional Improvements on Incentives to Invent 
At first blush, one might assume that making the processes at the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office cheaper, faster, and more accurate would 
encourage U.S. entities to patent and ultimately to innovate. After all, U.S. 
patents provide exclusive rights to inventions throughout the United States, 
and—by a wide margin—American inventors receive more U.S. patents 
than inventors from any other single country.209 For example, in 2011, the 
U.S. Patent Office issued approximately 224,000 patents.210 American 
inventors received about 109,000 of those patents.211 The second largest 
number of U.S. patents issued to Japanese inventors, who received only 
46,000 U.S. patents.212  
 
                                                                                                                     
 202. Id. § 303(a); In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
 203. In re NTP, 654 F.3d at 1275–76.  
 204. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 306–07 
(2011).  
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 306. 
 207. Id. at 299. 
 208. Id. at 305.   
 209. See Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Patents By Country, State, and Year - Utility Patents 
(December 2011), U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/ 
oeip/taf/cst_utl.pdf (last modified Mar. 21, 2012). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
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Moreover, all of the traditional improvements to the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office can increase the value of U.S. patents. Reducing the cost 
of obtaining U.S. patents increases their net value. Likewise, when U.S. 
patents issue more quickly, innovators may be able to commercialize new 
technology more quickly.213 Reducing the number of invalid U.S. patents 
in circulation also can increase the value of valid U.S. patents because 
invalid patents often decrease the returns from innovation. After a business 
commercializes a valid U.S. patent, the business may be sued for allegedly 
infringing an invalid U.S. patent. Even if an accused innovator litigates and 
successfully demonstrates that a patent is invalid, such a successful legal 
defense is expensive, in part because the innovator must prove that the 
patent is invalid by clear and convincing evidence.214 These litigation costs 
reduce the profits from valid U.S. patents.215 Alternatively, an innovator 
“may choose to make payments under licensing arrangements, or perhaps 
decide not to market its product at all, rather than contest the patent 
proprietor’s claims.”216 Thus, traditional improvements to U.S. patent law 
increase the value of U.S. patents. Because more U.S. patents issue to 
American inventors than to inventors from any other country, these 
improvements provide more benefit to American inventors as a group than 
to inventors from any other country.  
Nevertheless, for two reasons it is doubtful that reducing the cost, 
duration, and inaccuracy of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s patent 
application processing will increase incentives to invent in the United 
States relative to the incentives for foreign inventors. First, traditional 
improvements to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will help any 
inventor when she obtains a U.S. patent, regardless of her nationality. For 
example, if the America Invents Act reduces the cost of obtaining a U.S. 
patent by $10, both foreign and domestic inventors will save $10 when 
they apply for a patent. Moreover, an inventor who uses the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office more will receive greater benefits. If the cost of 
obtaining a U.S. patent drops by $10, an inventor who obtains ten patents 
will save $100, while an inventor who obtains five patents will save only 
$50. Likewise, if the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office were to process 
patent applications 20% faster, an inventor who previously would have 
received only five patents would instead receive six patents, while an 
inventor who previously would have received ten patents would receive 
                                                                                                                     
 213. Inventors may also use issued U.S. patents to obtain capital that can be used to 
commercialize new technology. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 642 (2002) 
(discussing the use of patents as signals in capital markets). 
 214. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 
(2011). 
 215. Indeed, James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer have argued that “by the late 1990s, 
litigation costs clearly exceeded the profits from patents outside the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries.” JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 140 (2008). 
 216. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 200, at 29. 
31
Hubbard: Competitive Patent Law
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
372 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
twelve patents. Similarly, if the value of U.S. patents increases by $10 per 
patent because the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issues fewer invalid 
patents, an inventor who obtains more U.S. patents will receive a larger 
gain than someone who obtains fewer U.S. patents. In short, the traditional 
improvements to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will magnify 
existing disparities in the acquisition of U.S. patents. 
Unfortunately, this magnification will not help American firms compete 
against foreign rivals. Although American inventors obtain more U.S. 
patents than inventors from any one foreign country, in global markets, 
American firms compete against all rivals from all countries. For the past 
four years, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has issued more U.S. 
patents to foreign inventors on the whole than U.S. inventors.217 For 
example, in 2011, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued 108,626 
patents to American inventors and 115,879 patents to foreign inventors.218 
If improvements to the procedures at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
increase the rate at which it issues patents by 10%, American inventors 
would receive 10,863 more patents, while foreign inventors would receive 
an even larger increase of 11,182 more patents. As a result, the 
improvements to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office would extend the 
lead of foreign inventors over American inventors by an additional 319 
U.S. patents.  
Similarly, foreign inventors would benefit more if the cost of obtaining 
U.S. patents declines. If the cost of obtaining a U.S. patent in 2011 had 
been $10 less, foreign inventors as a group would have saved more than 
$30,000 more than American inventors. Improving the functioning of the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may particularly disfavor American 
inventors in technological fields in which foreign inventors obtain 
substantially more U.S. patents than domestic inventors.219 Within these 
                                                                                                                     
 217. Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963–2011, supra 
note 96. 
 218. Id. 
 219. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office categorizes patents into approximately 400 
technology classes, although this classification system “is based primarily on technological and 
functional principles and is only rarely related to economists’ notions of products or well-defined 
industries (which may be a mirage anyway).” Griliches, supra note 77, at 1666. In 2010, more U.S. 
patents were issued to foreign inventors than domestic inventors in many of these classes. See 
Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Patenting In Technology Classes, Breakout by Geographic Origin 
(State and Country), U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecstc/clstc_gd.htm (last modified Mar. 27, 2012). Some significant 
technology classes in which U.S. inventors substantially trail foreign inventors in obtaining U.S. 
patents include: Dynamic Information Storage or Retrieval; Dynamic Optical Information Storage 
or Retrieval; Electrical Generator or Motor Structure; Electric Lamp and Discharge Devices; 
Electricity: Motive Power Systems; Incremental Printing of Symbolic Information; Chemistry: 
Electrical Current Producing Apparatus, Product, and Process; Television; Liquid Crystal Cells, 
Elements and Systems; Optics: Image Projector; Photocopying; Facsimile and Static Presentation 
Processing; Optics: Systems and Elements; Motion Video Signal Processing for Recording or 
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fields, the magnification of patenting disparities discussed above would be 
particularly dramatic. In other words, the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office cannot save dying domestic industries by improving processes 
contributing to their decline.220 
The second reason that improving procedures at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office may not provide American inventors with relatively 
enhanced incentives to invent is that domestic and foreign inventors may 
respond differently to changes to U.S. patent law. For instance, American 
and foreign inventors may face different costs in taking advantage of the 
improvements to U.S. patent law. Some foreign inventors may be less 
responsive to changes in U.S. law because these inventors face additional 
transaction costs, including language and cultural barriers.221 Indeed, some 
foreign inventors may be entirely unaware of improvements to U.S. patent 
law. On the other hand, American inventors sometimes may be slower to 
respond to changes to U.S. patent law. For example, even if the shift to a 
first-to-file system ultimately improves the efficiency of procedures at the 
U.S. Patent Office, American inventors may initially face additional costs 
in that many U.S. inventors must learn the new first-to-file system.222 In 
contrast, because almost every foreign patent system is already a first-to-
file system, foreign inventors may not face similar obstacles.223 Even when 
foreign and American inventors face similar transaction costs in 
responding to changes to U.S. patent law, foreign inventors may react more 
positively to those changes. Economic conditions may make some foreign 
inventors more sensitive to changes in the cost of applying for a U.S. 
patent.224 In a developing country, a $10 reduction in the cost of obtaining 
                                                                                                                     
Reproducing; Photography; Electrophotography; Radiation Imagery Chemistry: Process, 
Composition, or Product Thereof. Id. In classes where U.S. inventors lag behind foreign inventors, 
those foreign inventors frequently are from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, or Germany. Id.  
 220. As noted above, patent numbers are only proxies for innovation. See supra note 92 and 
accompanying text. Even if foreign inventors receive more patents than U.S. inventors, U.S. 
businesses might enjoy a competitive advantage if the U.S. patents obtained by U.S. inventors are 
more commercially valuable. 
 221. See infra notes 321–326 and accompanying text. 
 222. Inventors cannot simply rely on their attorneys learning the new first-to-file system. For 
example, to ensure that an inventor obtains a patent on a new discovery, she must be the first to file 
a patent application. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. An inventor therefore must 
understand the first-to-file system well enough to determine when to contact an attorney.  
 223. Michael Murray, Did Patent Reform Level the Playing Field for Foreign Entities?, 
BNA’S PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Oct. 7, 2011 (arguing that the changes worked by the 
America Invents Act had “several significant benefits for foreign inventors”); see also Duffy, supra 
note 128, at 703–06 (noting that global harmonization of patent law may be suboptimal because of 
differences between different countries, including culture). 
 224. The impact on different suppliers of changes in supply conditions will depend on the 
elasticity of the supply curves. GRIMWADE, supra note 142, at 24. If foreign inventors are more 
sensitive to changes in patenting costs, their supply curve for U.S. patents will be more elastic. If 
domestic inventors are less sensitive to changes in patent costs, then their curve for supplying U.S. 
patents will be less elastic. 
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a patent may be more impactful than the same savings in the United States.  
In such a situation, improvements in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
procedures might increase patenting by American inventors but increase 
even more patenting in the United States by foreign inventors.  
In sum, it is unclear whether typical approaches to improving the 
processing of applications by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will 
meaningfully increase the incentives for American entities to invent. 
Improving procedures at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office should help 
American inventors, but because many foreign inventors also use the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, such improvements will also help foreign 
inventors, and therefore may not significantly affect American 
competitiveness in global markets.225   
C.  Selective Improvements to U.S. Patent Law 
Although general improvements to U.S. patent law may equally impact 
incentives to invent for foreign and domestic inventors, more limited 
changes to U.S. patent law may provide enhanced incentives to invent for 
American inventors. To do so, changes to U.S. patent law must affect 
foreign and domestic businesses differently. To achieve this differential 
impact while avoiding explicit protectionism, U.S. patent law often must 
leverage factors extrinsic to law. This Section explores potential 
improvements to U.S. patent law that narrowly focus on situations in 
which American inventors differ from their foreign rivals.  
1.  Reducing Patenting Costs for a Selective Group of Inventors 
One potential way to provide enhanced incentives for American 
inventors vis-à-vis foreign inventors would be to reduce the cost of 
obtaining U.S. patents for a subgroup of patent applicants dominated by 
U.S. inventors. Independent inventors form such a group. For example, in 
2011, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued 15,890 patents to U.S. 
independent inventors but only 6,572 patents to foreign independent 
inventors—a difference of more than 9,000 patents.226 In fact, U.S. patent 
law already charges lower patent application fees for independent 
inventors,227 and the Patent Office’s website provides detailed information 
                                                                                                                     
 225. The effect of the America Invents Act on U.S. competitiveness may also be affected by 
certain inventor demographics. For example, inventors starting new businesses may focus on 
obtaining patents in their home countries. If so, improving the workings of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office would favor U.S. inventors hoping to start new businesses without 
simultaneously favoring foreign inventors. See supra note .  
 226. See Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Independent Inventors by State by Year, Utility 
Patents Report, January 1, 1975–December 31, 2011, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/inv_utl.pdf (last modified Mar. 
2012). 
 227. 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2006) (stating that an “independent inventor” shall have fees 
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to assist independent inventors.228 This special treatment ultimately helps 
more American inventors than foreign inventors. Further reducing the costs 
of obtaining a U.S. patent for independent inventors accordingly might 
improve incentives to invent more for American inventors than for foreign 
inventors. Indeed, the America Invents Act establishes even lower fees for 
particularly small and unsophisticated patent applicants.229 In addition, the 
Act establishes a “Patent Ombudsman Program,” and the sole objective of 
this program is “providing patent filing support and services to small 
businesses and independent inventors.”230  
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether favoring independent inventors in 
U.S. patent law meaningfully helps American businesses compete in global 
markets. To start, many patent law scholars dismiss the inventive 
contribution of independent inventors and contend that contrary claims are 
“frequently hyped and distorted.”231 For instance, in 2011, the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office issued approximately 224,000 patents;232 
independent inventors consequently accounted for only 10% of U.S. 
patents. More generally, a provision of patent law that is designed to favor 
American inventors because of their nationality may suffer from the 
protectionist pitfalls noted above, even if it hides its protectionist features 
behind other group selection criteria.233  
2.  Expediting Patent Application 
Another potential way to provide relatively enhanced incentives for 
American inventors may be to streamline and to improve patent processes 
in particular industries in which American inventors and American 
businesses already enjoy competitive advantages.234 Many factors affect 
competition, and different countries are successful in creating competitive 
                                                                                                                     
“reduced by 50 percent”).  
 228. See Inventors Resources, OFFICE OF INNOVATION DEV., http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/in 
dex.jsp (last modified July 10, 2012). 
 229. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316–318 
(2011). 
 230. Programs, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation 
/programs.jsp (last modified Sept. 9, 2012). 
 231. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 215, at 166; see GAMBARDELLA ET AL., THE VALUE OF 
EUROPEAN PATENTS:  EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN INVENTORS 23 (2005), available at 
http://www.alfonsogambardella.it/PATVALFinalReport.pdf (reporting that only 7.81% of European 
patentees are self-employed). 
 232. Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Patents By Country, State, and Year—Utility Patents 
(December 2011), supra note 96. 
 233. See supra notes 124–52 and accompanying text. 
 234. It is not entirely clear whether expediting innovation only within certain industries is not 
protectionism. If the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office expedites only certain patent applications, 
other applications may not be processed as quickly as they might have been. At the very least, 
however, selectively expediting patent processes is not facially protectionist.  
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advantages in different industries.235 For example, American companies 
have been effective in producing medical equipment and 
pharmaceuticals.236 Reducing the costs and delays of patents in these areas 
should increase, to some extent, the incentives to invent within these 
industries.237 Because American businesses already dominate these 
industries, American inventors and American businesses may most 
strongly feel the effects of these enhanced incentives to invent.  
Recently, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has developed two 
programs that streamline patent procedures in certain industries. In 2006, 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office started the Accelerated Examination 
Program, under which the Office accelerates the examination of 
applications that are particularly amenable to faster resolution.238 To 
qualify for this program, an inventor generally must pay an additional fee, 
but the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office waives the requirement for an 
additional fee if the invention “(i) [e]nhance[s] the quality of the 
environment; (ii) [c]ontribute[s] to the development or conservation of 
energy resources; or (iii) [c]ontribute[s] to countering terrorism.”239 
Similarly, in 2010, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office implemented a 
program to accelerate the patenting of inventions “pertaining to green 
technologies including greenhouse gas reduction (applications pertaining to 
environmental quality, energy conservation, development of renewable 
energy resources or greenhouse gas emission reduction).”240 The program 
intended to “accelerate the development and deployment of green 
technology, create green jobs, and promote U.S. competitiveness in this 
vital sector.”241 The program was limited to processing only 3,500 patent 
                                                                                                                     
 235. PORTER, supra note 12, at 196–97. 
 236. Id.; Econ. & Statistics Div., WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP. ORG., Patent Applications by 
Field of Technology and Origin: Top Origins, 2005-2009, WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP. 
INDICATORS 2011, 77 (2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/ (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2013) (reporting patent applications worldwide by field of technology from 2005 to 
2009); Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Patenting In Technology Classes, Breakout by Geographic 
Origin (State and Country), supra note 219 (reporting U.S. patents between 2007 and 2011 by 
technology class and country of origin). 
 237. Currently, patents are not used a great deal in some industries, particularly software and 
Internet firms. Graham et al., supra note 47, at 1290, 1292–93. 
 238. For example, to qualify for the Accelerated Examination Program, an inventor must file 
an application electronically; the application must contain only a limited number of patent claims; 
the inventor must agree to have an interview with the patent examiner; and the inventor must 
provide a statement that a pre-examination search for prior art was conducted. U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 708.02(a) (8th ed., 9th rev. 
2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html. 
 239. 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(c) (2010). 
 240. Office of Patent Legal Admin., Green Technology Pilot Program, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/green_tech.jsp (last modified May 7, 
2012). 
 241. Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark Office, The U.S. Commerce 
Department's Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) will pilot a program to accelerate the 
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applications and ended March 30, 2012.242  Nevertheless, the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office likely will develop additional programs to expedite 
patent examination in certain industries. The recent America Invents Act 
gives the Director of the Patent Office the power to prioritize the 
“examination of applications for products, processes, or technologies that 
are important to the national economy or national competitiveness.”243 By 
expediting the examination of inventions for “products, processes, or 
technologies” in which American inventors already enjoy competitive 
advantages, the U.S. Patent Office may be able to magnify those 
competitive advantages.244 
Although expediting patent examination within certain industries thus 
may help American inventors, these potential benefits should be weighed 
against four potential pitfalls. First, identifying which areas of technology 
to expedite may be difficult. In some industries, American companies may 
only have a competitive advantage in certain market segments. For 
example, the U.S. commercial airplane industry may be well-positioned to 
compete in the market for long-range commercial jets but not smaller, 
short-range commuter jets.  
Second, even when areas of U.S. competitive advantage can be 
identified, American industries could lose that advantage regardless of 
favorable patent laws. Reducing the cost and delay of patenting in certain 
industries may encourage foreign inventors and businesses to focus on 
these industries, speeding the decline of once-dominant American 
companies.245 In that situation, expediting patent processes eventually 
would magnify the competitive advantages of foreign inventors. 
Consequently, to enhance existing domestic competitive advantage, 
lawmakers likely would need to constantly monitor the performance of 
American innovators and quickly change which industries are expedited.246  
Third, even if the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office could implement a 
system that effectively expedites patent processes in appropriate industries, 
                                                                                                                     
examination of certain green technology patent applications (Dec. 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2009/09_33.jsp. 
 242. Sunset of the Patent Application Backlog Reduction Stimulus Plan and a Limited 
Extension of the Green Technology Pilot Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 77,979 (Dec. 15, 2011). 
 243. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 25, 125 Stat. 284, 337–38 
(2011). 
 244. See infra notes 310–311 and accompanying text. This approach may also foster norms 
that support innovation.  
 245. The impact of changes in patenting costs within certain industries will depend on the 
cross elasticity of demand for foreign and domestic inventors. See supra note 224 and 
accompanying text. 
 246. Indeed, because of the difficulties of foreseeing future changes related to technology, 
technology-specific patent laws are often disfavored. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 47, at 98–99 
(“The history of industry-specific statutes suggests that many fail because they are drafted with 
then-current technology in mind and are not sufficiently general to accommodate the inevitable 
changes in technology.”). 
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other countries might enact reciprocal measures, thereby reducing 
American prosperity. For example, the Korean Intellectual Property Office 
might enact similar provisions to enhance the competitive advantage of 
Korean inventors over American inventors within certain industries. 
Finally, selectively expediting invention in certain industries may violate 
TRIPs, which prohibits “discrimination” in the availability of patents based 
on “the field of technology.”247 If so, countries that are members of the 
World Trade Organization may seek sanctions against the United States for 
expediting patent examinations within certain industries.  
Because of these challenges to obtaining domestic competitive 
advantage by expediting innovation, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
should be cautious in selecting industries in which to expedite patent 
examinations. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office should only expedite 
examinations in an area of technology following a careful analysis of the 
resulting costs and benefits, including effects on competitive advantage. 
One potential approach would focus on expediting examinations in a small 
number of industries in which the United States appears to have a clear 
competitive advantage. For example, between 2007 and 2011, 
approximately 80% of U.S. patents on surgical instruments were issued to 
American inventors.248 By focusing on technological areas in which U.S. 
competitive advantage is clear, like surgical instruments, the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office can reduce the likelihood of inadvertently 
magnifying the competitive advantage of foreign inventors. Also, by 
limiting the number of affected industries, the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office would reduce both the chance of widespread retaliation by foreign 
patent offices and the likelihood that a foreign country would invoke the 
dispute resolution mechanisms of TRIPs. Unfortunately, if the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office expedited patent examination in only a small 
number of technological areas, the competitive benefits to domestic 
inventors and businesses would be limited. 
IV.  CHANGING U.S. CULTURE 
Some have called for a change in U.S. culture to boost American 
innovation.249 For example, economist Tyler Cohen has argued that, to 
                                                                                                                     
 247. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 127, art. 27.1. This provision of TRIPs, however, relates to 
“Patentable Subject Matter,” and therefore may not govern procedures for obtaining patents. Id. 
 248. Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Patenting In Technology Classes, Breakout by 
Geographic Origin (State and Country): Class 606, Surgery (instruments), U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecstc/606clstc_gd.htm (last 
modified Mar. 27, 2012). 
 249. “Culture” is difficult to define precisely. See GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S 
CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK RELATED VALUES 25 (1980) (describing 
cultural values as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one 
human group from another”); Maike Didero et al., Differences in Innovation Culture Across Europe 
4 (2008) (TRANSFORM Project Discussion Paper), available at http://www.transform-
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obtain economic prosperity, we should “[r]aise the social status of 
scientists.”250 President Obama made a similar appeal in his 2011 State of 
the Union address: “We need to teach our kids that it’s not just the winner 
of the Super Bowl who deserves to be celebrated, but the winner of the 
science fair.”251 Innovation analysts likewise have argued that culture 
“play[s an] indispensible role[] by training, inspiring, and motivating the 
innovators of the future.”252 Because typical approaches to improving 
patent law provide little relative increase in incentives to invent, 
nontraditional uses of patent law should be considered, such as the use of 
U.S. patent law to create a culture in the United States that fosters 
innovation. In such a culture, inventors would receive social subsidies for 
their work thereby increasing the incentives to invent vis-à-vis inventors 
from other cultures. 
A.  Law and Culture 
Because law and culture are interrelated, each can affect the other.253 
For instance, racist cultural views contributed to the passage of laws 
requiring racial segregation in education, while beliefs in equality 
contributed to desegregation.254 Similarly, legal scholars have identified 
complex interactions between law and norms, including numerous 
mechanisms by which law may affect social norms.255 For example, de jure 
                                                                                                                     
eu.org/publications/documents/Differences%20in%20Innovation%20Culture.pdf (collecting numerous 
definitions of culture used by sociologists); Stephen L. Mueller & Anisya S. Thomas, Culture and 
Entrepreneurial Potential: A Nine Country Study of Locus of Control and Innovativeness, 16 J. 
BUS. VENTURING 51, 58–59 (2000) (exploring the relationship between culture and entrepreneurial 
traits).  
 250. TYLER COWEN, THE GREAT STAGNATION: HOW AMERICA ATE ALL THE LOW-HANGING 
FRUIT OF MODERN HISTORY, GOT SICK, AND WILL (EVENTUALLY) FEEL BETTER 83 (2011). 
 251. President Obama, supra note 1.  
 252. ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 4; INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 8; KAO, supra note 12, 
at 266 (discussing adjustments to American values related to innovation); PORTER, supra note 12, at 
30, 113–15; DAVID SHENK, THE GENIUS IN ALL OF US: NEW INSIGHTS INTO GENETICS, TALENT, AND 
IQ 144 (2010) (“It must not be left to genes and parents to foster greatness; spurring individual 
achievement is also the duty of society. Every culture must strive to foster values that bring out the 
best in its people.”); see also SCOTT BERKUN, THE MYTHS OF INNOVATION 117 (2010) (arguing that 
culture impacts a society’s receptiveness to new ideas); CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 154, at 325 
(“The culture that survives to direct the future of the planet will be one that encourages as much 
creativity as possible . . . .”). 
 253. Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 37 
(2002). 
 254. E.g., Va. Code § 22-221 (1950) (requiring racial segregation). 
 255. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 2  (2000) (describing multiple ways 
that legal intervention can change social norms); Geisinger, supra note 253, at 68 (noting the effect 
of motorcycle helmet laws on individual certainty of helmet safety); Timothy R. Holbrook, The 
Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 591 (2006) (describing the social impact of 
racial segregation on understandings of race relationships); Hubbard, supra note 165, at 390; 
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 964–65, 1016 (1995) 
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racial segregation in education likely affected behavior outside of schools 
by reinforcing racist social norms.256  
One important way that law can affect culture is by impacting the 
“social meaning” of an activity.257 Many actions convey a social meaning 
in that performing the action expresses certain attitudes and 
commitments.258 Social meanings therefore form part of the costs and 
benefits associated with an action, and some people will avoid performing 
an action in order to avoid expressing the character traits, commitments, or 
connotations associated with the social meaning of that action.259 For 
example, at one point, smoking cigarettes may have expressed sensuality, 
sophistication, and independence.260 At that time, more people were likely 
to smoke because of those positive social meanings. Today, however, 
many people associate smoking with deleterious health effects.261 Because 
smoking has a more negative social meaning today, people tend to be less 
                                                                                                                     
(describing the efforts by the Soviet government to transform the social meaning of wearing a 
helmet); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 342–
43 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, Attitudinal Theory]; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, 
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 349 (1997) (stating that laws can 
both intentionally and unintentionally affect social norms); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 86–88 
(1999) (listing ways in which normative behavior and positive laws are interrelated); Cass R. 
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2043 (1996) (noting the 
effect of civil rights laws on the social meaning of nondiscrimination); Cass R. Sunstein, Social 
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 923 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Roles] 
(describing how laws may define social roles). 
 256. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“Segregation of white and colored 
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater 
when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as 
denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”). 
 257. See Lessig, supra note 255, at 951 (suggesting that these laws can be used by individuals 
or groups “to advance individual or collective ends”); see also Holbrook, supra note 255, at 591 
(“[I]t is beyond cavil that ‘the linguistic meaning of governmental action can have a moral 
impact.’”) (quoting Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1363, 1494 (2000)); Sunstein, Social Roles, supra note 255, at 949 (noting that 
government may use vivid images and rhetoric as a means of affecting social norms). 
 258. Lessig, supra note 255, at 951 (defining social meaning as the “semiotic content attached 
to various actions”); see also Sunstein, Social Roles, supra note 255, at 925–28. 
 259. Lessig, supra note 255, at 956–58, 1001; see also Harry Surden, Structural Rights in 
Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1610 (2007) (“[S]ocial norms impose social costs . . . .”). 
 260. See Meghan Daum, Smoking’s Sinful Sensuality in Movies, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 2007, at 
A23 (discussing the connection between the portrayal of smoking and sensuality in film). 
 261. See Lessig, supra note 255, at 1029 (describing how smoking stands “at odds” with the 
emerging health campaigns); Sunstein, Social Roles, supra note 255, at 926 (explaining that in the 
United States as opposed to other countries, smoking cigarettes may signal “something relatively 
precise and very bad” about an individual’s “self-conception” and “concern for others”); see also 
Lessig, supra note 255, at 963, 1008 (noting that the perceived legitimacy of a law affects its 
capacity to connect specific actions to broad norms). 
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inclined to smoke.262  
Perhaps the simplest way that law can affect the social meaning of an 
activity is by criminalizing it. Such a law may give the activity a negative 
social meaning.263 For example, criminalizing driving while under the 
influence of alcohol (DUI—commonly called “drunk driving”) may cause 
the social meaning of drunk driving to become more negative and therefore 
may dissuade people from engaging in the prohibited conduct.264 In 
addition to affecting social meanings, a law will also publicize a social 
view. In a majoritarian government, a law criminalizing an activity 
indirectly indicates that many people believe the activity already has a 
negative social value.265 For example, a law criminalizing drunk driving 
indicates that many people disfavor such behavior. Even if a DUI law does 
not affect an individual’s personal evaluation of the meaning of drunk 
driving, the law may affect that individual’s expectations regarding others’ 
beliefs. In the face of a criminal DUI statute, an individual may avoid 
driving intoxicated to avoid social sanctions from others.266  
Another way that law can affect the social meaning of an activity is by 
“tying” that activity to another aspect of society that has an established 
social meaning.267 For example, a proponent of a ban on flag burning may 
claim that the ban will promote a widely held value like patriotism.268 
Similarly, opponents to such a ban may claim that the ban would 
undermine the different goal of liberty.269 Regardless of the truth of these 
empirical claims, support for the ban can be influenced by its perceived 
connection to patriotism or liberty.270 The success of an effort to affect 
                                                                                                                     
 262. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.  
 263. See Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-
Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 37 (1990). 
 264. This understanding of the social meaning of crime perhaps explains why some people 
assert that activities that are not crimes in fact are not crimes. For example, the website 
http://www.privacyisnotacrime.com asserts that “privacy is not a crime . . . .” The website does not 
contend that under the current law privacy is in fact a crime. Rather, the website contends that 
people should have stronger rights to privacy. PRIVACY IS NOT A CRIME, 
http://www.privacyisnotacrime.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2013); see also PHOTOGRAPHY IS NOT A 
CRIME, http://www.photographyisntacrime.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2013); SKATEBOARDING IS NOT 
A CRIME, http://www.skateboardingisnotacrime.com/extras (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). 
 265. See Geisinger, supra note 253, at 64–65, 70; McAdams, Attitudinal Theory, supra note 
255, at 358. This inference is undermined if some people cannot or do not vote or if the validity of 
the vote count is suspect.  
 266. Law may also affect activities with positive social meanings. For instance, allowing 
taxpayers to deduct charitable contributions from their taxable income may help give such 
contributions a positive social meaning and may indicate that many people believe such 
contributions already have a positive social meaning.  
 267. Lessig, supra note 255, at 1009.  
 268. POSNER, supra note 255, at 112 (noting the symbolism of honoring and desecrating the 
flag).   
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
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social meaning through tying therefore depends in part upon the perceived 
legitimacy of the tying.271 
Social meaning is closely linked to the concept of “salience,” which 
describes the extent to which the public pays attention to an issue.272 “Due 
to limited attention span, apprehension, and information processing 
abilities, individuals can only process a small number of beliefs at any 
single time.”273 New legislation can raise the salience of the issues 
addressed by those laws, particularly if politicians discuss the legislation in 
high-profile contexts.274 Moreover, tying can affect the salience of an issue: 
associating an activity with a high-salience issue can increase that 
activity’s salience.275 For example, a connection between the war on 
terrorism, which arguably has high salience, and the war on drugs may 
increase the salience of the latter. 
B.  Culture and Innovation 
Culture affects competitive advantage in innovation in at least three 
respects.276 First, countries may develop innovative industries related to 
activities that are particularly important in that culture.277 “[N]ations tend 
to be competitive in activities that are admired or depended upon; that is, 
where the heroes come from.”278 For example, Americans’ love of sports 
has likely contributed to the success of American businesses in producing 
athletic products.279 The United States is home to the corporate 
headquarters for three of the top four manufacturers of sporting equipment: 
Nike, Reebok, and Under Armour.280 With national passions like this, a 
                                                                                                                     
 271. Professor Lawrence Lessig has argued that when government attempts to change social 
norms, there is a risk of causing an “Orwell effect: when people see that the government or some 
relatively powerful group is attempting to manipulate [norms], they react strongly to resist any such 
manipulation.” Lessig, supra note 255, at 1017; see also id. at 963, 1008 (noting that the perceived 
legitimacy of a law affects its capacity to connect specific actions to broad norms). As a result of the 
Orwell effect, the government may have an incentive to minimize the extent to which its message 
seems to be from the government. Id. at 1017–18. 
 272. Geisinger, supra note 253, at 60. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 63 (noting that “passage of a law may not be the main source of information” 
regarding a law and that “publicity about the reasons for the passage of law will be the main source 
of information”); see also ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 159 (“The role of a nation’s leaders is to foster 
the right environment for innovation through inspiration, funding, and policy.”). 
 275. See Geisinger, supra note 253, at 61.  
 276. This list is not exclusive; many factors potentially affect innovation.  
 277. PORTER, supra note 12, at 90–91.  
 278. Id. at 115. 
 279. Id. at 91. 
 280. See The Forbes Fab 40: The World’s Most Valuable Sports Brands, FORBES.COM, 
http://www.forbes.com/pictures/mlm45jemm/the-most-valuable-company-brands#content (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2013); see also About Nike, Inc., NIKE, INC., http://nikeinc.com/pages/about-nike-inc 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2013) (identifying the location of Nike’s corporate headquarters); Environment 
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substantial portion of the domestic labor market may participate in the 
activity, and domestic businesses therefore benefit from access to labor 
with skills and knowledge tailored to the industry. Domestic businesses are 
also well-positioned to monitor domestic consumer demand. Furthermore, 
because domestic demand for industries related to national passions is 
sophisticated, global demand trends may trail domestic trends.281 By 
focusing on domestic demand, domestic industries related to national 
passions are able to anticipate (and perhaps influence) changes in global 
demand.282 “If prestige and national priority favor an industry, the ripple 
effect on competitive advantage can be enormous.”283 
The second manner in which culture can affect innovation is that some 
societies foster “inventing norms,” which generate praise and respect for 
innovators.284 In cultures with such norms, inventors receive additional 
benefits from their discoveries in the form of enhanced social status.285 
There are good reasons to believe that inventing norms are widely accepted 
and enforced in the United States.286 For example, successful innovators in 
the United Sates are often publicly praised.287 When Thomas Edison died, 
President Herbert Hoover turned off all of the lights in the White House for 
one minute.288 More recent examples of innovators who achieved celebrity 
status include Bill Gates (founder of Microsoft, Inc.), Steve Jobs 
(cofounder of Apple, Inc.), and Mark Zuckerberg (founder of Facebook, 
Inc.). Reactions to the death of Steve Jobs in 2011 revealed the extent to 
which he was widely esteemed even outside of technology circles. The day 
he died, Jobs was praised by President Obama as “exemplif[ying] the spirit 
of American ingenuity.”289 Mainstream media also praised Jobs as a 
“visionary,”290 likening him to Thomas Edison, Henry Ford, and John D. 
                                                                                                                     
at Headquarters, REEBOK.COM, http://corporate.reebok.com/en/corporate_citizenship/ 
environment_at_headquarters/default.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (identifying the location of 
Reebok’s corporate headquarters); Careers, UNDER ARMOUR, http://www.underarmour.jobs (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
 281. PORTER, supra note 12, at 86–90.  
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 115. 
 284. See Hubbard, supra note 165, at 373. 
 285. Id. at 378–82. 
 286. See BERKUN, supra note 252, at 111 (“Americans hold ingenuity to be one of the best 
kinds of goodness . . . .”); see generally Hubbard, supra note 165, at 378–88 (discussing inventing 
norms). 
 287. BERKUN, supra note 252, at 71 (“Innovators became easy heroes in America . . . .”).  
 288. Randy Alfred, Aug. 4, 1922: For Whom the Bell Tolls Not, WIRED (Aug. 4, 2010, 12:00 
AM), http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2010/08/0804alexander-graham-bell-funeral-silence.  
 289. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the Passing of 
Steve Jobs (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/05/stat 
ement-president-passing-steve-jobs.  
 290. John Markoff, Apple’s Visionary Redefined Digital Age, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/business/steve-jobs-of-apple-dies-at-56.html?pagewanted=all. 
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Rockefeller.291  
A third way in which culture contributes to competitive advantage in 
innovation also involves social norms. Inventing norms directly praise 
innovation, but other social norms may encourage activities and values that 
indirectly encourage innovation.292 For example, a society in which 
education and hard work are lauded may produce greater numbers of 
creative, educated, and skilled citizens,293 which may help domestic 
businesses develop new technologies294 and create domestic demand for 
those technologies.295  
Finally, sociological studies have identified “innovation values,” which 
are broad cultural characteristics that correlate with innovation. These 
studies begin by determining the extent to which certain cultural 
characteristics are present in some countries and absent from others, and 
then correlate these characteristics with a country’s innovation output.296 In 
                                                                                                                     
 291. Walter S. Mossberg, Mossberg: The Steve Jobs I Knew, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203476804576613732041665792.html?mod= 
technology_newsreel; Patricia Sullivan, Steve Jobs Dies; Apple Co-Founder Was 56, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/steve-jobs-apple-computer-co-
founder-dies/2010/09/21/gIQAc14aOL_story.html?hpid=z1. 
 292. See ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 7–33 (arguing that certain values contribute to innovation). 
Other social norms may hamper innovation. For example, social norms based on erroneous 
stereotypes may dissuade women from pursuing careers in science and invention. See AUGUSTINE, 
supra note 12, at 49 (“Women constitute 46% of the US workforce, but only 23% of the science 
and engineering workforce.”); John P. Walsh & Sadao Nagaoka, Who Invents?: Evidence from the 
Japan-US Inventor Survey 9 (RIETI discussion paper series, 09-E-034, 2009), available at 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/09e034.pdf (reporting that only 5% of U.S. patentees are 
women). 
 293. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 69 (“Patience, continuity, and their close relative 
perseverance are all fundamental catalysts of successful innovation.”); BERKUN, supra note 252, at 
172 (“Study the histories of great creators, and you’ll find a common core of willpower and 
commitment as their driving force.”); CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 154, at 61 (noting that 
creative, successful individuals are often tenacious workers); PORTER, supra note 12, at 114 (“In no 
small part, a nation’s success depends on the types of education [that] talent chooses to obtain and 
where it chooses to work.”).  
 294. ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 170 (“One of the most significant factors in deciding where to 
locate an R&D center is a strong research community and talent base.”); Porter & Stern, supra note 
79, at 29; Scott Shane, Cultural Influences on National Rates of Innovation, 8 J. BUS. VENTURING 
59, 63 (1993) [hereinafter Shane, Innovation] (noting that “[i]nnovation requires skilled engineers 
and scientists”). 
 295. PORTER, supra note 12, at 95 (“Provided it anticipates buyer needs in other nations, early 
local demand for a product or service in a nation helps local firms to move sooner than foreign 
rivals to become established in an industry.”). 
 296. See, e.g., Anneli Kaasa & Maaja Vadi, How Does Culture Contribute to Innovation? 
Evidence from European Countries, 19 ECON. OF INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 583, 592 (2008); 
Mueller & Thomas, supra note 249, at 51; Shane, Innovation, supra note 294, at 59–60; Scott A. 
Shane, Why Do Some Societies Invent More than Others?, 7 J. BUS. VENTURING 29, 29 (1992) 
[hereinafter Shane, Invent]; Hongyi Sun, A Meta-Analysis on the Influence of National Culture on 
Innovation Capability, 10 INT’L J. OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP & INNOVATION MGMT 353, 354 (2009). 
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determining national characteristics to test for correlations with innovation, 
sociologists often rely on a system of cultural characteristics developed by 
Geert Hofstede.297 For example, “individualism” is one of Hofstede’s 
cultural characteristics.298 In highly individualistic cultures, people prefer 
to act in the interests of themselves and their families rather than acting in 
the interests of a larger group of people.299 Another important cultural 
dimension that Hofstede developed is tolerance of “power distance,” which 
describes the extent to which people from a country accept inequality in 
power between people.300 A country that exhibits significant power 
distance embraces hierarchy and resists change.301 In non-power distant 
countries, “people believe in shared power, equality, and social 
mobility.”302 Using survey responses from more than 88,000 people from 
thirty-three different countries, Hofstede determined the extent to which 
these countries exhibited certain cultural characteristics, including 
individualism and power distance.303 
Building on Hofstede’s work, sociologists have identified statistically 
significant correlations between high levels of innovation304 and two 
cultural characteristics: high levels of individualism and low tolerance of 
power distance.305 For example, Scott Shane has identified a positive 
correlation between per capita patenting rates and individualism, and a 
negative correlation between per capita patenting rates and tolerance of 
power distance.306 Although these studies demonstrate only correlations 
                                                                                                                     
 297. See generally GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
IN WORK RELATED VALUES (1980) (describing Hofstede’s system for classifying cultures).  
 298. Shane, Innovation, supra note 294, at 60–61. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 30. 
 301. Shane, Innovation, supra note 294, at 61. 
 302. Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 31. 
 303. Id. at 30. A single country may contain multiple cultures, though Hofstede’s 
categorization of countries does not reflect this possibility. Didero, et al., supra note 249, at 3. 
 304. Sociologists measure innovation in different ways. See, e.g., Kaasa & Vadi, supra note 
296, at 588 (using patent applications in the European Patent Office); Mueller & Thomas, supra 
note 249, at 52 (survey data); Shane, Innovation, supra note 294, at 64 (per capita trademark rates); 
Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 30 (per capita patent rates); Sun, supra note 2966, at 353 (a 
blended innovation index).  
 305. Kaasa & Vadi, supra note 296, at 592; Mueller & Thomas, supra note 249, at 59; Shane, 
Innovation, supra note 294, at 67; Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 30 (per capita patent rates); 
Sun, supra note 296, at 353 (analyzing whether Hofstede’s cultural characteristics correlate with a 
“national innovation capability index”); see also ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 18 (arguing that 
“openness” contributes to innovation); KAO, supra note 12, at 23, 59, 156 (same). But see Kaasa & 
Vadi, supra note 296, at 592 (reporting that “individualism appears to have a much weaker or 
nonexistent relationship with patenting intensity”). 
 306. Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 30. These correlations remain statistically significant 
even when adjusted for wealth. Id. at 39. In a later study, Shane also considered whether 
individualism and tolerance of power distance correlated with per capita trademarking rates. Shane, 
Innovation, supra note 294, at 64, 65.  
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between these cultural characteristics and innovation, these correlations 
suggest that encouraging individuality and limiting power distance may 
support innovation. Indeed, these results are consistent with other 
scholarship arguing that autonomy, independence, and freedom facilitate 
innovation307 and that hierarchy, inequality, and lack of communication 
between superiors and subordinates slow innovation.308  
C.  Patent Law and Innovation Culture 
Like other types of law, patent law can affect culture. In particular, its 
effects on social meaning and salience can impact the cultural features 
identified in the previous Section that correlate with competitive advantage 
and innovation: national passions, inventing norms, and innovation values. 
For example, the expressive aspects of patent law may affect which 
activities are considered national priorities. As discussed above, under the 
new America Invents Act, the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office has the power to declare that certain “products, processes, or 
technologies . . . are important to the national economy or national 
competitiveness.”309 Within these technological areas, the Director may 
accelerate the processing of patent applications.310 By declaring that certain 
areas of technology are national priorities, the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office may improve the social meaning of working within those industries 
and also increase the salience of those positive social meanings. Even if the 
magnitude of these effects is not large, the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office may be able to create marginal improvements in the social meaning 
and salience of an industry, thereby marginally improving the incentives to 
invent within that industry.311 
Patent law also may affect social norms that favor and encourage 
inventing. In an earlier article, I described in detail many ways that patent 
law can influence these norms.312 Although I will not repeat those 
arguments here, the recent changes to U.S. patent law in the America 
Invents Act illustrate some of the ways that patent law may affect cultural 
incentives to invent. To start, the signing of a law with a title that explicitly 
                                                                                                                     
 307. ESTRIN, supra note 4, at 104 (“To take root, innovation requires flexible, open, less 
hierarchical processes . . . .”); Kaasa & Vadi, supra note 296, at 585–87; Shane, Innovation, supra 
note 294, at 61 (collecting sources); Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 33–35 (same). 
 308. Shane, Innovation, supra note 294, at 61 (collecting sources); Shane, Invent, supra note 
294, at 31–33 (same). 
 309. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 25, 125 Stat. 338 (2011).  
 310. Id. For a critique of this approach, see supra notes 243–248 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra notes 277–283 and accompanying text (discussing the competitive advantages 
associated with national passions). But see infra notes 320–330 and accompanying text (discussing 
concerns regarding the magnitude of the impact of U.S. patent law on U.S. culture). 
 312. See generally Hubbard, supra note 165. For example, awarding patents helps to enforce 
inventing norms because a patent signals to a broad audience that the patent recipient has 
discovered a new invention. Id. at 398–403. 
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associates America with invention may increase the salience of invention 
in American society, particularly given the current rarity of bipartisan 
agreement.313  
Furthermore, the Act may have also helped to give invention a positive 
social meaning. This is because politicians have used the Act to connect 
invention to economic prosperity, which possesses positive social meaning 
and exceptionally high salience in the current economic downturn. When 
the Act was introduced in the Senate, Senator Patrick Leahy asserted that 
the Act is “a measure that will help create jobs, energize the economy, and 
promote innovation.”314 Likewise, when the Act was introduced in the 
House of Representatives, Representative Lamar Smith stated that “[t]his 
legislation is crucial for American economic growth, jobs, and the future of 
U.S. competitiveness.”315 After the Act passed both the House and the 
Senate, President Obama quickly signed it, declaring that the Act will 
“help give entrepreneurs the protection and the confidence they need to 
attract investment, to grow their businesses, and to hire more workers.”316 
News agencies widely repeated the asserted connection between the 
America Invents Act and economic prosperity.317 The passage of the Act, 
together with the statements of politicians regarding the economic goals of 
the legislation, may help to give invention a positive social meaning, 
thereby fostering a culture in the United States that is conducive to 
innovation.  
                                                                                                                     
 313. Peter Nicholas, Obama Signs Patent-Approval Law, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/16/nation/la-na-obama-patents-20110917. In the House of 
Representatives, the Act passed with 304 supporting votes and only 117 opposing votes. Press 
Release, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, House Passes Smith’s Patent 
Reform Bill (June 23, 2011), http://judiciary.house.gov/news/Patent%20Reform%20Passes.html. In 
the Senate, the bill passed by an even larger majority, with 89 votes in favor of the Act and only 9 
votes opposing it. Edward Wyatt, Fighting Backlog in Patents, Senate Approves Overhaul, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/business/senate-approves-overhaul-of-
patent-system.html.  
 314. 157 CONG. REC. S948 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Senator Orrin 
Hatch similarly asserted that the legislation would “help strengthen our economy.” 157 CONG. REC. 
S951 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 315. 157 CONG. REC. H4421 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 316. President Obama, supra note 39. In a press release issued the same day, President Obama 
further asserted that the Act will “support job creation and strengthen America’s competitiveness in 
the global economy.” Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Signs America 
Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New 
Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act -overhauling-patent-system-stim. 
 317. See, e.g., Michael A. Memoli & Peter Nicholas, Obama Signs Patent Overhaul Law, 
Pushes Jobs Act, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/16/news/la-pn-
obama-patent-20110916 (noting that President Obama asserted that patent reform is “a common-
sense step to boost the economy”); Darlene Superville, Obama Signs 1st Major Patent Law Change 
Since 1952, Associated Press, Sept. 16, 2011 (reporting that the Act “has been hailed as a milestone 
that will spur innovation and create jobs”). 
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Finally, patent law can also support broad cultural values that correlate 
with high rates of innovation, such as individualism and low tolerance of 
power distance. For example, the treatment of independent inventors under 
U.S. patent law supports these values. As noted above, U.S. patent law 
provides independent inventors with significant assistance in obtaining 
patents, and the America Invents Act increases this support.318 By singling 
out and supporting certain inventors because of their independence, U.S. 
patent law financially encourages “independence” and also expresses broad 
public support for it. Similarly, these same provisions of patent law express 
support for low tolerance of power distance because independent inventors 
seek to prosper through the quality of their ideas, not through advantages 
based on social hierarchy.319   
D.  The Magnitude of Cultural Effects of Patent Law 
The impact of U.S. patent law on culture is likely larger in the United 
States than in other countries for two reasons. First, U.S. law and the 
actions of U.S. politicians provide more information regarding the opinions 
of American voters than the beliefs of citizens of a foreign country because 
democratic elections, to a certain extent, encourage politicians to conform 
their behavior to their constituents’ beliefs.320 As a result, U.S. laws and 
statements by U.S. politicians promoting invention signal that many 
American citizens believe that invention is highly salient and imbued with 
positive social meaning. A person in the United States therefore may be 
encouraged to try to discover a new invention by the increased expectation 
of praise for her efforts. In contrast, a U.S. law favoring invention would 
be less likely to cause a person in China to expect praise from Chinese 
citizens.  
A second reason that the expressive impact of U.S. patent law is larger 
in the United States than in other countries is that American citizens are 
more likely than foreigners to learn U.S. law or scrutinize the actions of 
U.S. politicians.321 U.S. citizens can more easily follow developments in 
U.S. law through popular media and without the need for translation. 
Moreover, the benefits from monitoring U.S. law (or costs from ignoring 
it) are frequently greater for American citizens than foreign citizens 
because much U.S. law has little extraterritorial impact and because only 
U.S. citizens can vote disfavored U.S. politicians out of office.322 Citizens 
                                                                                                                     
 318. See supra notes 227–30 and accompanying text. 
 319. See Shane, Innovation, supra note 294, at 61; Shane, Invent, supra note 294, at 31. 
 320. U.S. politicians may be concerned about other actions by foreign countries and their 
citizens, including economic and military reactions to U.S. laws.  
 321. Many foreigners closely monitor U.S. politics, and increasing the salience of an issue in 
the United States might raise the salience of the issue in another country, particularly if that country 
enacts new laws in response to U.S. legislation. 
 322. It is a felony for a noncitizen to vote in a federal election in the United States. See 18 
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of foreign countries may benefit less from efforts to understand U.S. law 
because they are unaffected by those laws or unable to change them.  
One group of foreign citizens nevertheless may be highly responsive to 
the expressive impact of U.S. patent law: foreign applicants for U.S. 
patents. These foreign citizens may closely monitor U.S. patent law and 
may benefit from certain value-laden portions of the patent act, such as the 
provisions favoring independent inventors. Indeed, the patenting behavior 
of foreign inventors suggests that they often pay close attention to U.S. 
patent law. One way for foreign inventors to obtain U.S. patents is by filing 
U.S. patent applications directly with the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office. Alternatively, a foreign inventor can apply for a patent in a foreign 
country and then use that foreign patent application to file a so-called 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application in the United States. 
Interestingly, the vast majority of foreign inventors do not obtain U.S. 
patents by leveraging applications from their home countries into PCT 
applications in the United States. Instead, most foreign inventors file patent 
applications directly with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. For 
example, in 2011, nonresident inventors filed 227,907 patent applications 
directly with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office323 and only 81,441 PCT 
applications.324 
Even if foreign applicants for U.S. patents closely track U.S. patent law 
and politics, however, the expressive impact of U.S. patent law likely will 
be largest in the United States because the expressive impact of U.S. patent 
law in the United States extends to non-inventors. For example, even 
people who have never applied for a patent may laud a successful 
innovator. The reaction to the death of Steve Jobs in mainstream media 
demonstrates the extent to which even technophobes may respect 
innovators.325 Furthermore, the social meaning of invention can affect 
whether people strive to become inventors in the first place. Improving the 
social meaning of invention among children and students may encourage 
some of them to pursue inventive careers. The benefits of using U.S. patent 
law to shape culture are thus larger in the United States than in any other 
country.326 
                                                                                                                     
U.S.C. §§ 911, 1015(f) (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-3(c)(2)(C), 1973gg-5(a)(6)(A)(i), 1973gg-
7(b)(2) (2006). 
 323. IP Statistics Data Center, WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://ipstatsdb. 
wipo.org/ipstats/patentsSearch (select “1a- Direct applications” as the “Indicator,” select “Resident 
& non-resident count by filing office” as the “Report Type,” select “2011” for both values in the 
“Year Range,” and select “United States of America” as the “Office ”) (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
 324. Id. (select “1b- PCT national phase entries” as the “Indicator,” select “Resident & non-
resident count by filing office” as the “Report Type,” select “2011” for both values in the “Year 
Range,” and select “United States of America” as the “Office ”) (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
 325. See Markoff, supra note 290; Mossberg, supra note 291; Sullivan, supra note 291. 
 326. Some foreign countries are actively trying to shape their culture related to innovation. For 
example, in 2010 Malaysia established the Malaysia Innovation Agency, which is a governmental 
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Nevertheless, it is difficult to measure the extent to which U.S. patent 
law can affect culture in a way that promotes domestic competitive 
advantage. “Values and norms are powerful forces for controlling and 
directing human behavior,”327 but it is not clear to what extent U.S. patent 
law can shape these values and norms rather than merely reflect them.328 
Moreover, the cultural impact of certain aspects of patent law likely 
diminishes over time. Today, the America Invents Act and the high-
publicity attention that politicians have given the Act probably have 
worked together to increase the salience of inventing in American society 
and to ensure that the social meaning of invention is positive. However, 
Congress cannot credibly pass a major patent reform bill ever year; when 
laws are perceived as lacking legitimacy, they may have little impact on 
culture.329 Furthermore, the America Invents Act changed U.S. patent law 
                                                                                                                     
entity whose responsibilities include “[p]romoting the culture of innovation in the public and 
private and education sectors in Malaysia . . . .” Lee Tatt Boon, Attaining High Income Through 
Innovation, 25 WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP. REPORT 40 (2011). 
 327. Mueller & Thomas, supra note 249, at 58; accord SHENK, supra note 252, at 151 (“Our 
cultural landscape directly affects whether and how people challenge themselves and others to 
achieve.”). 
 328. Indeed, some expressive effects of law could undermine innovation. For example, some 
scholars have argued that granting patents for academic discoveries undermines social norms that 
encourage scientists to collaborate with each other. See Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and 
Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 239 (2006) 
(arguing that there is a correlation between the rise in patent law and the continual decline in the 
quantity and quality of scientific discourse); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the 
Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 216 (1987) (recognizing the 
disincentive for researchers guided by scientific norms to publish prior to patent protection); Jeremy 
M. Grushcow, Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent System Revealed, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 78 
(2004) (attributing the increased secrecy by professors not seeking patents to a shift in normative 
attitudes toward reciprocity and collegiality). The results of these studies are inconclusive. See 
Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary Between Academic 
and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237, 2239 (2009) (“[S]cholars may have been overly 
concerned about the potential erosion of academic sharing norms . . . .”). The National Research 
Council recently issued a report that concluded that “the expansion of faculty entrepreneurial 
activity and institutional technology transfer activity at U.S. research universities has not seriously 
undermined the core missions of knowledge generation and dissemination.” NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 40 (2011). 
 329. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 255, at 99 (discussing the relationship between the distrust 
of the government and the internalization of the values of a law in the context of shaming 
punishments); Geisinger, supra note 253, at 68 (describing the process of norm internalization 
associated with popular understandings of wearing a motorcycle helmet); Holbrook, supra note 
255, at 592 (noting the impact laws can have on individual perceptions of societal norms); 
McAdams, Attitudinal Theory, supra note 255, at 358–59 (discussing the importance of 
“legitimacy” in the expressive theory of law); see also Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and 
Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1139–40 (2005) 
(discussing law, norms, and legitimacy in the copyright context); Lucas Osborn, Instrumentalism at 
the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419, 425 (2012) (discussing judicial decisions and 
legitimacy). 
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to be more consistent with the patent laws of other countries. As the patent 
laws of more countries align, their cultural effects may do the same.330 In 
the long run, the cultural impact of U.S. patent law therefore may not 
provide enhanced incentives to invent in the United States if the patent 
laws of other countries provide their citizens with similar advantages.  
CONCLUSION 
Innovation is critical to the success of American businesses in global 
markets. Because patent law is an important mechanism for promoting 
innovation, changes to U.S. patent law might create competitive 
advantages for American innovators. Because both foreign and domestic 
innovators use the U.S. patent system, one potential mechanism for 
boosting domestic innovation is to favor American inventors explicitly 
through protectionist patent laws. Though the United States has a long 
history of embracing protectionist patent law, the costs of such 
protectionism outweigh the expected benefits. Protectionism generally 
reduces domestic welfare by raising prices for domestic consumers and by 
insulating American businesses from the competitive pressures that drive 
innovation.331 In addition, if the United States were to enact protectionist 
patent law, the United States would violate international treaties, risking 
retaliatory action by its trade partners.  
Another potential mechanism for using U.S. patent law to create 
domestic competitive advantage focuses on traditional approaches to 
improving the processes of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: making 
these processes faster, cheaper, and more accurate. U.S. political leaders 
implicitly contend that the recent America Invents Act creates competitive 
advantage in this fashion.332 Typical approaches to improving the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, however, likely will not provide American 
entities with enhanced incentives to invent vis-à-vis foreign inventors 
because more foreign inventors utilize the U.S. patent system than 
American inventors. Most of the benefits to improving the U.S. patent 
system would therefore be enjoyed by our competitors. Moreover, foreign 
inventors may be more responsive to improvements at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office than American inventors.  
U.S. patent law might nevertheless be able to increase relative 
incentives for Americans to invent in the United States by selectively 
improving the processing of patent applications for U.S. patents in 
                                                                                                                     
 330. Some countries arguably have gone further than the United States in using law to promote 
values related to innovation. For example, Finland has “enshrine[d] in law Internet access as a basic 
human right . . . .” BEYOND E-READINESS, supra note 81, at 8. 
 331. PORTER, supra note 12, at 68 (“Nations succeed in industries where pressures are created 
that overcome inertia and promote ongoing improvement and innovation instead of an easy life. 
Nations fail in industries where firms stop the upgrading process.”).  
 332. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.   
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technological areas in which American businesses and inventors already 
enjoy competitive advantages. Such selective improvements could magnify 
those existing advantages. However, implementing selective improvements 
will not be easy. For example, it may be difficult to identify reliably which 
areas of technology to target for improvements. Moreover, foreign 
countries may retaliate by enacting similar measures, thereby 
disadvantaging U.S. interests in global markets. 
Because traditional improvements to the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office may equally affect foreign and domestic inventors, policy makers 
seeking to boost U.S. competitiveness should also consider nontraditional 
approaches to U.S. patent law, such as the effect of U.S. patent law on U.S. 
culture. This aspect of U.S. patent law likely affects U.S. businesses and 
inventors more than their foreign rivals. In this way, changes to U.S. patent 
law and related statements by U.S. politicians can help to foster a culture in 
the United States that facilitates innovation. For instance, in signing the 
new America Invents Act and declaring innovation to be a national 
priority, President Obama may actually have helped to achieve that goal. 
Unfortunately, however, verifying and quantifying the effect of U.S. patent 
law on the values and beliefs of the American people—and thus on 
American competitiveness—is exceedingly difficult if not impossible.  
In short, adjusting U.S. patent law has little capacity to promote 
domestic competitive advantage by increasing American inventors’ 
incentives to invent vis-à-vis the incentives felt by foreign inventors. 
Protectionist U.S. patent law is likely futile. Traditional improvements to 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office benefit both foreign and domestic 
innovators, so American businesses and inventors often gain little, if any, 
relative advantage over foreign rivals. The cultural impact of U.S. patent 
law is well-suited to favoring U.S. interests, but the magnitude of such 
effects is unclear.   
Given these limits, the United States should continue to explore 
nontraditional approaches to U.S. patent law that can create domestic 
competitive advantage. In addition, the United States should consider 
generating domestic competitive advantage through adjustments to other 
areas of law that also affect innovation, including immigration,333 tax,334 
                                                                                                                     
 333. See INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 11 (arguing that the United States must 
“[r]eform immigration to attract the best and brightest [science and engineering] students from 
around the world and provide work permits to foreign [science and engineering] graduates of U.S. 
institutions”); GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 53–54. The Washington Post 
reports that “[i]mmigrants founded a quarter of all U.S. engineering and technology companies 
started between 1995 and 2005” Vivek Wadhwa, They’re Taking Their Brains and Going Home, 
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 8, 2009. Despite this contribution, “the lumbering U.S. immigration 
bureaucracy helps push [immigrants] away” from the United States. Id.; see also AUGUSTINE, supra 
note 12, at 50 (“In fact, it can be responsibly argued that America’s scientific enterprise would 
virtually cease to function without the foreign-born talent that makes up such a crucial part of it.”). 
 334. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 62 (“In the early 1990s, the United States ranked first 
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education,335 and government expenditures.336 These areas of law are 
important topics for future research on innovation and competitive 
advantage. These areas of law, however, face an important challenge that is 
often absent from patent law. Changes to the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office do not require increases in federal spending because the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office is funded solely through “user fees,” including fees 
paid by patent applicants.337 In contrast, changes to tax, education, and 
government expenditures likely will require increased federal funding. In 
an era of deep cuts to the federal budget, political leaders are reluctant to 
increase any expenditures.338 On the other hand, because innovation is vital 
to the U.S. economy, avoiding these expenditures may be risky. As one 
innovation commentator has noted, “Our competitors have not been 
standing still.”339 By the time the U.S. economy catches its breath, it may 
find that it has fallen behind in the global race for economic prosperity. 
                                                                                                                     
among OECD nations offering tax incentives for R&D; but by 2004, it had fallen to 17th place.”); 
INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 58–59 (arguing that the United States must “[e]nact a 
permanent, restructured [research] tax credit”); KAO, supra note 12, at 37 (discussing tax credits for 
research and development). Many states have enacted tax laws to promote innovation; see, e.g., 
State Enacts Credit for Life Sciences Businesses That Increase Tax Revenue, BIOTECH WATCH 
(BNA) (Apr. 25, 2011) (discussing tax incentives for innovation in Utah); State Enacts Job 
Incentive Program for Life Sciences in Redevelopment District, BIOTECH WATCH (BNA) (Aug. 16, 
2011) (discussing tax incentives for innovation in Rhode Island); Wisconsin Enacts Legislation 
Expanding, Creating Biofuel Production, Sales Incentives, BIOTECH WATCH (BNA) (June 11, 2010) 
(discussing tax incentives for innovation in Wisconsin). 
 335. See Lechleiter, supra note 4; Zakaria, supra note 4 (arguing that “if we are to get the U.S. 
back to work, we need . . . to rebuild American education”). Certain parts of the U.S. educational 
system appear to be ineffective. For example, in 2007, one-third of high school students in 
California failed to graduate. KAO, supra note 12, at 34; see also CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 
154, at 330 (“Clearly, the availability of training is crucial for developing any kind of talent.”). 
 336. INNOVATE AMERICA, supra note 11, at 11; Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, USPTO Launches Small Business Innovation Research Pilot Program (Oct. 28, 2011), 
http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2011/11-61.jsp (describing a pilot program by the U.S. Patent Office 
providing additional resources to certain innovative small businesses); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–
12 (describing the ownership of patents on inventions discovered using federal funding). According 
to one commentator, when adjusted for inflation, “US federal support of research in the physical 
sciences, mathematics, and engineering . . . has been stagnant for 2 decades.” AUGUSTINE, supra 
note 12, at 58. 
 337. H.R. Rep. 109-372, at 5 (2005). 
 338. GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 26; see Eric Lipton, Lawmakers Trade 
Blame as Deficit Talks Crumble, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/11/21/us/politics/lawmakers-concede-budget-talks-are-close-to-failure.html?pagewanted=all 
(noting that the federal budget will decrease 1.2 trillion dollars over ten years beginning in 2013). 
 339. AUGUSTINE, supra note 12, at 3, 10; see GATHERING STORM, REVISITED, supra note 12, at 
4, 33–34. 
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Appendix A: Global Patent Applications, Patents, and Populations 
in Absolute Numbers and Per Capita by Inventor’s Country in 2011 
 
                                                                                                                     
 340  The World Intellectual Property Office uses the country of residence for the first inventor 
listed on a patent or patent application to approximate inventor nationalities. Methodological 
Information, WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/ 
statistics/patents/pdf/patent_stats_methodology.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). Strictly speaking, the 
country of residence for an inventor is not the same as the inventor’s nationality and multiple 
inventors with different nationalities often collaborate to discover new inventions. Nevertheless, the 
country of residence for the first inventor likely serves as a reliable proxy for inventor nationality 
because discrepancies between residences and nationalities and among multiple inventors will 
generally offset one another. 
 341. Data: Indicators: Population, total, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/SP.POP.TOTL (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).  
 342. IP Statistics Data Center, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://ipstatsdb.wipo.org/ 
ipstats/patentsSearch (select “1 - Total patent applications (direct and PCT national phase entries)” 
as the “Indicator,” select “Total Count by Applicant’s Origin” as the “Report Type,” select “2011” 
for both values in the “Year Range,” and select the countries listed above for the values under 
“Select Origin”) (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).   
 343. IP Statistics Data Center, WORLD INTELLLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://ipstatsdb.wipo.org/ 
ipstats/patentsSearch (select “2 - Total patent grants (direct and PCT national phase entries)” as the 
“Indicator,” select “Total Count by Applicant’s Origin” as the “Report Type,” select “2011” for 
both values in the “Year Range,” and select the countries listed above for the values under “Select 
Origin”) (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).   
Country340 Population
341 
(millions) 
Patent 
Applications 
Filed 
Worldwide342 
Patents 
Granted 
Worldwide343 
Per Million 
Capita 
Patent 
Applications 
Per 
Million 
Capita 
Patents 
Japan 128 472,417 304,604 3,696 2,383 
U.S. 312 432,298 201,158 1,387 646 
China 1,344 435,608 118,158 324 88 
Republic of 
Korea 50 187,454 97,714 3,766 1,963 
Germany 82 172,764 72,346 2,114 885 
France 65 65,349 34,766 999 531 
Russian 
Federation 142 31,433 22,177 221 156 
U.K. 63 49,938 18,275 797 292 
Switzerland 8 37,477 17,564 4,740 2,221 
Italy 61 27,679 16,212 455 267 
Netherlands 17 32,376 14,924 1,939 894 
Sweden 9 21,480 10,905 2,272 1,154 
Finland 5 11,516 5,827 2,138 1,082 
Denmark 6 11,565 4,260 2,075 764 
Israel 8 10,821 4,237 1,393 546 
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